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Nurses and physicians: A longitudinal analysis of mobility between jobs and labor supply

By

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Abstract

We estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of Registered Nurses' labor supply. A distinguished feature of our model is that the random terms in the utility functions are correlated over time and jobs (habit or job persistence). Past options and not only the past optimal choices matter for the current choices. Given observed incentives and institutional constraints on offered hours, we find that nurses are mobile when they are young (less mobility than among physicians), but there is also a weak tendency of higher mobility again when they are approaching retirement age. Wage increases have a modest impact on labor supply. The overall elasticity for nurses is close to zero. These low elasticities shadow for stronger responses, shifting labor away from part time jobs in the public and private sector towards full time jobs in the private sector. A change in taxation away from the progressive tax system towards a flat tax of 28% gives Registered Nurses a very modest incentive to shift their job to private hospitals. For physicians the impact is stronger.

JEL classifications: J22, I10, C35

Keywords: Nurses' labor supply, multi-sector, panel data.

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1. Introduction

The main motivation for the paper is that Norway's population is ageing and the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of the population aged 65+ to the population aged 20-64 is estimated to nearly double: from 32.7% in 2011 to 62.2% in 2050 (OECD, 2013). This is in line with the average rise for the OECD area as a whole, although the increase in Norway is less dramatic than projected in most EU countries. In the EU21 countries, the ratio is projected to increase from 37.1% in 2011 to 76.1% in 2050.

This phenomenon implies that in the coming decades there will be many elderly people requiring care in hospitals and long term care (OECD 2005). There will be a growing demand for nurses and medical doctors. This increase in demand can be covered with more nurses and medical doctors educated at Norwegian universities or migrating from abroad. The latter might be a difficult option, since most other OECD countries have the same need for people working in the health sector (OECD 2013).

In this paper, we focus on another option. We study how nurses respond to incentives to work longer hours and we compare them with medical doctors. Almost 50% of Norwegian nurses work part time and their working hours are among the lowest in the European Union (see OECD 2005). There might thus be room for increasing labor supply of nurses. Specifically, we wish to understand to what degree wages and taxes affect the labor supply of nurses. We do this by estimating a longitudinal discrete choice model on panel data for Registered Nurses. Andreassen et al. (2013) estimate a longitudinal discrete choice model on panel data for physicians. The contribution of the present paper is to estimate a similar model for nurses and to compare the results for nurses with the results for physicians published in Andreassen et al. (2013). Comparing these two groups is of great interest, because one usually thinks that they represent very different behavior in the labor market. In Norway it is generally thought that one reason for nurses to choose their profession is that it gives flexibility with respect to working hours, something that can be

important when raising a family. Doctors are, on the other hand, thought to be more motivated by prestige and money. We find that this thinking is to some extent supported by the data, with nurses having smaller wage elasticities than doctors and greater stability (habit persistence) than doctors when young.

In textbook labor supply models individuals can choose any hours of work. The choice of hours is then determined by preferences and economic incentives only. This assumption of uniformly distributed hours available in the market is at odds with how working hours are organized in hospitals and primary care. The available choices for nurses, determined by the employers and the unions, are different types of working loads. Thus, available hours is not uniformly distributed. The most suitable framework for estimating labor supply, given these institutional constraints, is a discrete choice model, first introduced in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and discussed in more detail in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). Within this framework the deterministic preferences in choice probabilities are weighted with the densities of hours offered in the market. In a survey Creedy and Kalb (2005) coined this framework for weighted logit choice probabilities.

In the model estimated below, we allow for taste or habit persistence that may slow down mobility across jobs and working loads when wages and taxes are changed to stimulate labor supply. Habit formation and consequently habit persistence was introduced in the modelling of consumer demand by Gorman (1967) and Pollak (1970); see also Deaton (1992) for lengthy discussions of habit persistence in demand models and Dynan (2000) for a more recent empirical work related to food expenditures. So far habit formation has been introduced in consumer demand model. To our knowledge we are the first to include habit persistence attached to type of jobs in labor supply models.

The labor supply of RNs has been extensively investigated empirically during the last decades. Shields (2004) provides an excellent review of the studies. These previous models tend to be reduced form models, with a loose contact to structural decision models. Contractual arrangements are not explicitly accounted for and hence offered hours are implicitly assumed to be uniformly distributed.

By allowing habit formation in labor supply models and non-uniformly distributed offered

hours (contractual arrangements or institutional constraints), we should expect that labor supply is less elastic compared to models where these features are ignored. To test this conjecture, we have chosen to use data for the period 1997-1999. During these years the Norwegian government gave a considerable boost to the wages of nurses. Also the private sector responded by increasing wages. The annual disposable income in public hospitals and public health care increased by as much as 31-35 percent from 1997 to 1999, both for part-timers and full-timers⁴. The increase in the private sector was of the same magnitude. Moreover, we simulate the labor supply effects of a replacement of the current tax system with a flat tax, which reduces the marginal tax rates substantially. The aim is to check labor supply responses when economic incentives to work more are really improved.

The main conclusion is that by cutting taxes and/or increasing wages nurses move to jobs with higher working loads. However, the impact is not strong. Wage increases have the greatest effect on labor supply among nurses aged 35-50, while less progressive taxes stimulates in particular medical doctors to move to jobs with higher working loads in the private sector.

Another important result concerns the rationing or availability of jobs and thus hours offered by employers. Our model allows the estimation of the probabilities that individuals are offered different types of jobs. The results show that offered hours are more constrained for nurses than for physicians. Given observed incentives and institutional constraints, we find that nurses are more mobile when they are young (even if they are less mobile than young physicians), but there is also a weak tendency of higher mobility again when they are approaching retirement age.

On cross-sectional data from the same period as in the present paper, Di Tommaso et al. (2009) estimate a static discrete choice model of labor supply on nurses. The estimates indicate that overall labor supply is rather inelastic with an average elasticity of 0.33⁵. This average elasticity is similar to

⁴ See Table B.6 in Appendix B.

⁵ A 10 percent increase in the wage level for all nurses is estimated to yield a 3.3 percent increase in the unconditional expectation of hours supplied in the population of nurses. Labor supply is aggregated across individuals and job types and then the elasticities are calculated for this aggregate sum with respect to the wage rate in all job types. This aggregate elasticity is equivalent to taking the elasticity of the labor supply for every individual, and then calculating the weighted sum using the predicted choice probabilities of hours worked for each individual as weights.

the ones reported in Shields (2004), but much lower than the average elasticity (0.8) obtained on another set of Norwegian data and reported in Askildsen et al (2003). In Hanel et al (2014) the framework is similar to the one employed in Di Tommaso et al. (2009), with the exception that institutional constraints are not accounted for and the deterministic part of the utility function is quadratic. In Hanel et al. (2014), elasticities are somewhat on the high side, which is also driven by the decision of the nurse to enter or exit the profession.

Our paper shows that when estimating a dynamic model on job transitions data, accounting for habit persistence and institutional constraints, the labor supply of nurses becomes more inelastic than obtained in these previous papers, also significantly lower than in Di Tommaso et al (2009).

In the next section we give a brief but self-contained review of the model. Data is presented in Section 3. Estimates, elasticities and the result of a policy simulation are reported in the following three sections. Section 7 concludes.

2. Model

The model we employ allows for habit or job persistence. This implies correlation in utilities across time. Let $U_{jn}(t)$ be the utility of nurse n when working in job type j at time t . The utility function is assumed to be random because there are job attributes that affect preferences that we do not observe. Let $v_{jn}(t)$ be the systematic (deterministic) part of the utility function and let $\varepsilon_{jn}(t)$ be the random term, assumed to be independent and identical extreme value distributed. The random term accounts for the job attributes that are not observed by the econometrician. Notice that this implies that the random terms vary across job types (and individuals).

Following Dagsvik (2002) we assume that

$$(1) \quad U_{jn}(t) = \max_j \left[U_{jn}(t-1) - \rho v_{jn}(t) + \varepsilon_{jn}(t) \right]$$

The expected value of $U_{jn}(t)$ is given by

$$(2) \quad E[U_{jn}(t)] = \ln \left[\sum_{r=t_0}^t \exp(v_{jn}(r) - (t-r)\rho) \right]$$

or

$$(3) \quad \exp\{E[U_{jn}(t)]\} = \sum_{r=t_0}^t \left[\exp v_{jn}(r) - (t-r)\rho \right]$$

To calculate correlation across utilities it is convenient to calculate correlation of a monotone transformation of the utilities:

$$(4) \quad \text{corr}\left\{\exp[-U_{jn}(s)], \exp[-U_{jn}(t)]\right\} = \frac{\exp\{E[U_{jn}(s)]\}}{\exp\{E[U_{jn}(t)]\}} e^{-(t-s)\rho}; \text{ for } s \leq t$$

We observe that if covariates are constant over time the correlation from t to $t-1$ is approximately equal to $e^{-\rho}$. The coefficient ρ is a preference discount factor. If $\rho = 0$ there is a complete strong taste or habit persistence and utilities are perfectly correlated across time. If $\rho = \infty$ there is no taste persistence at all and $U_{jn}(t) = v_{jn}(t) + \varepsilon_{jn}(t)$. The inclusion of taste or habit persistence is a behavioral assumption and it implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices. This implies that the current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal one. If $\rho = \infty$, the model degenerates to a standard multinomial logit model that can be estimated on panel data, see Train (2003).

From the model we can derive transition probabilities, which will be estimated on panel data. We will assume that nurse n will choose the state that maximizes utility, given his or her

choice set. Nurses can choose between 10 states, which vary with respect to type of institution (hospitals versus primary care), sector (public versus private), hours offered by the institutions in the health care sector (part time versus full time), and also not working at all (zero hours). Part time is defined as a number of hours of work less than 30. We will assume that the choice set is related to availability of jobs, characterized by offered hours. Thus, in our model the nurses are not free to choose any hours they like to work. We will assume that

$$(5a) \quad g_{jnt}(h_{jnt}) = \exp(d_{1j}z_{jnt}); z_{jnt} = 1 \text{ if } h_{jnt} \leq 30; = 0 \text{ otherwise, (part-time)}$$

$$(5b) \quad g_{jnt}(h_{jnt}) = \exp(d_{2j}z_{jnt}); z_{jnt} = 1 \text{ if } h_{jnt} \geq 30; = 0 \text{ otherwise, (full-time)}$$

Note that the $g(\cdot)$ function captures the rationing of full time jobs and d_{kj} are parameters to be estimated for each sector j and working loads k . The $g(\cdot)$ functions capture the availability of full time and part time hours in the different jobs. For physicians there are only a rationing of full time jobs, while for nurses there is a rationing of part time as well as full time jobs.

Let Q_{ijnt} denote the probability that doctor or nurse n moves from state i in period $t-1$ to state j in period t , and Q_{iint} denotes the probability that doctor or nurse n stays in state i also in period t .

With the assumed probability distribution for ε_{jnt} , we get (Dagsvik (2002):

$$(6) \quad Q_{ijnt} = \frac{V_{jnt}}{\sum_{r=t_0}^t \left\{ \left[\exp(-(t-r)\rho) \right] \sum_{k=0}^9 V_{knr} \right\}}; Q_{iint} = 1 - \sum_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^9 Q_{ijnt}; \forall i, j = 0, 1, \dots, 9$$

where $V_{jnt} = \exp(v_{jnt})g_{jnt}(h_{jnt})$

The different sectors that the nurse can choose are:

0 = not working⁶

⁶ Implying that hours of work are zeros.

- 1 = working part time in a hospital in the private sector;
 2 = working full time in a hospital in the private sector;
 3 = working part time in primary care in the private sector;
 4 = working full time in primary care in the private sector;
 5 = working part time in a hospital in the public sector;
 6 = working full time in a hospital in the public sector;
 7 = working part time in primary care in the public sector;
 8 = working full time in primary care in the public sector;
 9 = working in other sectors⁷.

2.1 The deterministic part of the utility function

We will assume that the systematic or deterministic part of the utility function is given by:

$$(7) \quad \log v_{jnt} = \left(A + \sum_{s=1}^4 a_s X_{snt} \right) \frac{(C_{jnt} 10^{-5})^\lambda - 1}{\lambda} + \left(B + \sum_{s=5}^7 b_s X_{snt} \right) \frac{(L_{jnt})^\gamma - 1}{\gamma}$$

Here C_{jnt} is disposable annual income, and it is given by

$$(8) \quad C_{jnt} = f_t(w_{jnt} 48 h_{jnt} + SI_{nt}) + I_{nt},$$

The hourly wage rate is w_{jnt} , $48 h_{jnt}$ denotes weekly hours of work times number of working weeks per year (48), SI_{nt} is the wage income from secondary jobs and I_{nt} is non-labor income, including the after-tax income of a spouse, child benefits and other benefits. The functional form of $f_t(\cdot)$ depends on the characteristics of the tax function, $T_t(\cdot)$, which is a step-wise linear

⁷ The classification of sectors is based on the standard used by Statistics Norway, which is based on the statistical Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) used in the European Community. The sector "Other sectors" consists of all types of jobs that do not fall in under either hospital or health care services. It thereby includes nurses doing a wide variety of work outside the traditional health care sectors, such as administrative work in government and in the private sector or working in non-health sectors.

tax function at time t , see tables A.1-A.3 in Appendix A.

Annual leisure is denoted L_{jnt} . We assume 12 hours a day for rest and sleep. Therefore, annual leisure in this definition is equal to the total number of hours in a year (8760) minus sleeping time in a year minus hours of work. Leisure includes therefore hours in the week-ends and in vacation time:

$$(9) \quad L_{jnt} = \frac{8760 - 12 \times 365 - 48h_{jnt}}{8760}$$

Moreover X_{1nt} is age and X_{2nt} is age squared. We account for the possibility that there is an impact on hours supplied when spouses are working in jobs where shift work is very common like in the health sector. We have thus included a dummy variable X_{3nt} which equals 1 if the nurse is married to a person in the health sector, and equal 0 otherwise. Other observed covariates that are included to account for observed heterogeneity are the dummy variables X_{4nt} that equals 1 if more than one job, and equal to 0 otherwise; X_{5nt} equals 1 if number of children ≤ 6 ; and X_{6nt} equals 1 if number of children $\{>6, <11\}$ and finally X_{7nt} equals 1 if female, and equal to 0 otherwise.

To account for the possibility that habit persistence may increase with age (a lower preference discount parameter) we let the preference discount parameter ρ_{nt} depend on the age and age squared of the nurse:

$$(10) \quad \rho_{nt} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 X_{1nt} + \rho_2 X_{2nt}$$

The wage equation is estimated separately. Selection is accounted for. An important contribution is that we allow for correlation of wages across the various jobs. Once the wage equation is estimated it is included in disable income, which is part of the utility function. The remaining parameters of the model is estimated through *simulated* maximum likelihood. The simulation is due to the fact that we have to integrate out the unobserved random terms of the wage equation. Details about the estimation procedure can be found in Andreassen et al (2013)

In Dagsvik and Jia (2015) it is shown that this type of model is non-parametrically identified.

3. Data

The data used in this study are the result of merging register data from Statistics Norway with data on physicians and nurses collected by The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (from the PAI⁸ register). The register data from Statistics Norway consists of demographic, educational, income and labor market data. The income data is taken from tax returns, while the labor market data consist of employee data merged with data on employers. Tax functions are given in Appendix A.

The resulting panel data set covers *all* employed registered nurses in Norway in the period 1997 – 1999. Appendix B shows the data for nurses and compare them with the data for physicians as reported in Andreassen et al. (2013). We only use observations of married individuals who did not change their marital status during the observation period. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the sample selection. The final sample has 28,578 married nurses.

We have coded the data so that we ended up with 10 different sectors of work described above. Table B.2 gives the distribution of physicians and nurses across sectors. Most nurses work in hospitals and primary care. Among working nurses, 59 percent work part-time in 1999, while only 31 percent of working physicians work part time.

Our data only included hours worked per year, so weekly hours are calculated by dividing hours worked in a year by 48 (weeks in a year minus vacation). Table B.3 shows the number of hours worked in the different sectors. Working hours for full time jobs are longer in the private sector compared to in the public sector, while working hours for part time jobs are longer in the public sectors. Table B.4 reports also the distribution between short part-time and long-part time for nurses.

⁸ The PAI register consists of data on workers in public enterprises, including physicians and nurses working in hospitals and health care.

Table B.5 shows the mean of the explanatory variables for married physicians and married registered nurses. Women constitute around 27 per cent of physicians and 95 per cent of nurses. 13 percent of nurses are married with somebody in the health sector and 43 percent of physicians are married with somebody in the health sector. The percentage of nurses with an external job decreases from 7 percent in 1997 to 6 percent in 1999. For physicians, the percentages changes from 10 to 8 percent.

Our model is based on the assumption that we can simulate the different levels of consumption and leisure which could be achieved by each individual in each sector if they chose to work there. Our calculations are based on estimated wage equations done independently for the three years 1997, 1998 and 1999. The resulting levels of possible consumption and leisure are reported in Table B.6 and B.7 respectively. For the states which are observed chosen by an individual, we use observed leisure, while for other potential, but not chosen states, we use average leisure among those observed in the state. Consumption is determined by wage income, capital income, transfer - income, and the income of the spouse. All income variables were deflated by the consumer price index. Leisure is expressed as a percentage of available time. Available time includes time over the week-ends and vacation time but excludes 12 hours per day of sleeping and personal care time.

In Appendix C, Tables C.1-C.4, we report the observed transitions across states. Although “stayers” are dominating there are also a considerable amount of “movers”.

Appendix D report the data and the estimates of the wage equation.

4. Estimates

In this section we report the results for the labor supply of nurses alongside with the results for physicians estimated by Andreassen et al (2013). We believe that it is useful to make a comparison between nurses and physicians because they are the two most important parts of the health workforce.

Estimation of the utility function is given in Table 1, which also contains the estimation of the

difference between the parameters for nurses and physicians, with the corresponding standard errors and the level of statistical significance.

(Table 1 approximately here)

The exponents (λ for consumption and γ for leisure) in the utility function are both less than 1 which implies that the utility function is strictly concave. For both medical doctors and nurses, the marginal utility of consumption is declining in consumption. For nurses, the part of the utility that is related to leisure is not significantly different from a log linear function.

The differences between physicians' and nurses' parameters are statistically significant. In particular, the exponent λ for consumption is higher for nurses, while the exponent γ for leisure is higher for physicians implying.

(Figure 1 approximately here)

The marginal utility of consumption is a concave function of age with a peak around 40 year of age for nurses and 45 for medical doctors, see Figure 1. Therefore the marginal utility of consumption starts declining at a younger age for nurses than for physicians, again indicating that doctors are more concerned about monetary remuneration than nurses.

For both nurses and physicians, the marginal utility of consumption is shifted upwards if the spouse also works in the health sectors. This implies that health workers married to health workers have stronger incentives to work longer hours in the health sector than other health workers.

The impact of having children below the age of 7 on the leisure term is not significantly different from zero for physicians but positive for nurses. Nurses with children below 7 value their leisure time more than physicians with children below 7. Thus nurses with small children are less willing to work long hours compared to physicians. It is interesting to note that the impact of older

children on the marginal utility of leisure is positive and similar for both nurses and physicians

Our result that nurses value leisure more than physicians is re-enforced by the estimate of the parameter of the dummy for females in the leisure term of the utility function. This parameter is not significantly different from zero for physicians but it becomes significant and positive for nurses. The difference in this parameter for nurses and physicians is also statistically significant.

The estimate of the habit persistence parameters, ρ 's, implies that, if age is ignored, the utilities are less correlated across time for doctors than for nurses. Thus physicians are more mobile than nurses. If we take into account age (see Figure 2), the young are more mobile than the old, given wages, taxes and other incentives. As seen in Figure 2 this is particular the case for medical doctors.

(Figure 2 approximately here)

Mobility, as captured by the habit persistence parameters, are declining with age, more strongly for physicians than for nurses, and with a weak tendency of increasing again when the health workers are approaching retirement age.

Table 2 provides the estimates of the rationing function, i.e. the availability of jobs. For nurses, the values of the parameters for jobs' availability are higher in absolute values than for physicians, which means that rationing of jobs for nurses is stricter than for physicians. Thus, physicians have more options when it comes to working hours and sectors. For nurses, the estimates also imply that long part time jobs are more available in the public sectors. Full time jobs instead are more available in the private than in the public sector.

(Table 2 approximately here)

The goodness of fit for this model is given in Figures 3 and 4. With a few exceptions, in

particular for private hospitals where the observations are few, the model fits the data pretty well.

(Figures 3 and 4 approximately here)

5. Elasticities

In Table 3 we report the impact of an overall wage increase in all years from 1997 to 1999 on labor supply in 1999. In Table 4 we report similar elasticities based on some selected characteristics.

(Table 3 and 4 approximately here)

We observe that the labor supply of both nurses and doctor are rather inelastic (Table 3). An overall wage increase of 1 percent increases labor supply in terms of total hours of work in 1999 by only 0.03-0.04 percent. However, an overall wage increase is predicted to have a stronger impact on the distribution of physicians and nurses across job types. An overall wage increase is predicted to shift in particular physicians to full time jobs in hospitals. An overall wage increase is predicted to increase the number of nurses working full-time in the private sector.

Table 4 shows the percentage changes in hours in 1999 when wages increase by 1% in all years (1997 to 1999). Labor supply elasticities of physicians do not vary much according to age. However, the wage elasticities of nurses vary more, being higher if they are not working, than if they are working full- time or part-time. The elasticities for those not working are higher for nurses than for physicians. Having young children does not affect the labor supply of physicians (the coefficient is not significantly different from zero), but has a relatively strong effect on the wage elasticities of nurses. These results indicate that for nurses the work/not work decision is more important than for physicians (especially if they have young children), while income plays a greater role for physicians.

6. Policy simulation

In Table 5 we report the impact of change in taxation away from the current progressive tax system towards a flat tax of 28%, which is a substantial change. The change in taxation is implemented for the whole period 1997- 1999. This change in taxation gives the medical doctors an incentive to shift their work from part time jobs to full time jobs, in particular to jobs in the private sector. The reason for this is that wage levels and wage dispersion is much higher in the private than in the public sector. By moving to the private sector and by increasing their working loads, the medical doctor can keep more of their gross gain due to lower taxes. For nurses, the impact of lower taxes is much weaker. Most of them have lower income in potential new jobs, even in the private sector, than physicians, and therefore they do not benefit that much from shifting jobs. Some of the nurses have so low potential income that the flat tax of 28% increases their taxes. Moreover, their spouses get higher disposable income and this also has a negative impact on their labor supply. We therefore find that some quit working.

(Table 5 approximately here)

7. Conclusion

We have estimated a discrete choice model with random terms where we allow for these terms to be correlated over time and jobs (habit persistence). Past options and not only the past optimal choices matter for the current choices. Given observed incentives we find that both nurses and in particular medical doctors are mobile when they are young, but there is a weak tendency of higher mobility again when physicians and nurses are approaching retirement age.

Wage increases have a modest impact on labor supply. The overall elasticity for both physicians and nurses are close to zero. These low elasticities shadow to some extent for stronger responses, shifting labor away from part time jobs in the public and private sector towards full time jobs in the private sector when wages are increased. This latter result accords well with facts. In recent years the real wages in Norway have increased substantially and there are now more physicians and nurses working in private hospitals. The regulation of hours is more rigid in the public

than in the private sector.

In our paper, nurses cannot choose any hours that they would like to work, given the job they occupy. They can choose between 10 different sectors with different working loads some in the private sector and some in the public sector, including not working. In order to work more they have to shift job. The availability of the different type of jobs and working loads are estimated in the model, together with preferences. The availability of the different types of jobs capture the institutional constraints in the health sector, determined by employers and unions. These constraint and job persistence in preferences are the main reason for the weak impact of changes in economic incentives on job mobility and labor supply. So, we do not think that a wage change, e.g 10 percent, will move many people from part-time to full-time work. This is our main point and we refer to other papers (like Askildsen, 2003 and Hanel 2014), where institutional constraints and job persistence are ignored. It should also be noted that we use transition data to estimate our model while the above papers use cross-sectional data. Our conclusion is thus that labor supply among nurses is rather inelastic. To increase labor supply in the population of nurses, longer shifts and therefore less part-time work would be more effective. In Norway, the unions have opposed such a change.

Our results indicate that a reform that removes some of the constraints related to the lack of full time jobs for nurses may increase labor supply.

A change in taxation away from the progressive tax system towards a flat tax of 28% gives medical doctors an incentive to shift their job to private hospitals. The reason for this is that the wage level and dispersion is much higher in the private than in the public sector. With a lower and flat tax rate, they can keep more of these private benefits. For nurses the impact is much more modest. Their potential wage when moving is not that much higher than in the public sector, at least compared with the situation for physicians.

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Table 1. Estimates of the utility function

Variables	Physicians		Nurses		Difference	
	Estimate	Std.Err.	Estimate	Std.Err.	Estimate	Std.Err.
Consumption						
Constant	-2.28**	0.823	-3.10**	0.4116	0.82	0.9201
Age, 1998	0.14**	0.0355	0.22**	0.0179	-0.07	0.0397
Age squared	0.0016**	0.0004	-0.0028**	0.0002	0.0012**	0.0004
Spouse in health sector	0.15**	0.0541	0.10*	0.0512	0.05	0.0745
More than one job	0.22**	0.0526	0.10**	0.0338	0.12*	0.0626
Last year of University (turnus) §	-0.71**	0.1933	-	-	-	-
Exponent λ	0.31**	0.0651	0.55**	0.0335	-0.24**	0.0732
Leisure						
Constant	5.07**	0.3906	3.75**	0.2324	1.32**	0.4545
No. of children less than 7 yrs	0.09	0.096	1.04**	0.0644	-0.95**	0.1156
No. of children 7-18 yrs	0.24**	0.0729	0.20**	0.0441	0.04	0.0852
Female	0.10	0.1626	1.08**	0.1794	-0.98**	0.2421
Exponent γ	0.42*	0.1799	-0.08	0.0875	0.51*	0.2001
Habit persistence						
Constant	13.76**	1.4822	4.85**	0.467	8.91**	1.554
Age, 1998	-0.49**	0.0593	-0.13**	0.0202	-0.36**	0.0627
Age squared	0.0046**	0.0006	0.0013**	0.0002	0.0033**	0.0006
No. of observations	6,564		28,578			
Log-likelihood	-10,993.1		-38,088.1			

* Statistically significant at 5% level, ** Statistically significant at 1% level

§ It is mandatory for all physicians to work their final year of studying medicine as an apprentice doctor in a given, often rural, location

Table 2. Estimates of the rationing function (job availability)

Sector	Physicians		Nurses	
		Std.Err		Std.Err.
1. Public sector, long part time			4.69**	0.0311
2. Public hospital, full time	0.25**	0.0024	6.03**	0.0427
3. Private hospital, long part-time			3.91**	0.1486
4. Private hospital, full time	0.13**	0.0078	6.16**	0.1690
5. Public health care, long part- time			4.70**	0.0326
6. Public health care, full time	0.21**	0.0038	5.98**	0.0450
7. Private health care, long part- time			3.66**	0.1387
8. Private health care, full time	0.17**	0.0060	6.26**	0.1398
9. Other, long part-time			4.09**	0.0486
No. of observations	6,564		28,578	
Log-likelihood	-10,993.1		-38,088.1	

* Statistically significant at 5% level, ** Statistically significant at 1% level

The rationing of part-time in the case of nurses concerns long part-time

Table 3. Labor supply elasticities in 1999 based on the observed population. Percent change in number of worker and hours when wages increase by 1% in all years 1997-1999.

Sector	Physicians	Nurses
0. Not working	-0.30	-0.24
1. Public sector, part time	0.02	0.00
2. Public hospital, full time	0.03	0.03
3. Private hospital, part-time	0.04	0.03
4. Private hospital, full time	0.26	0.14
5. Public health care, part-time	-0.03	0.00
6. Public health care, full time	0.06	0.04
7. Private health care, part-time	-0.03	0.00
8. Private health care, full time	0.14	0.10
9. Other	0.04	0.04
Weighted average of total hours	0.04	0.03

Table 4. Labor supply elasticities in 1999 based on selected combinations of observed characteristics. Per cent change in hours in 1999 when wages increase by 1% in all years 1997-1999. Females with a husband who does not work in the health sector.

	30 years of age		40 years of age		50 years of age	
	Physicians	Nurses	Physicians	Nurses	Physicians	Nurses
Not working in 1997						
No children 18 or younger	0.11	0.18	0.12	0.18	0.10	0.11
2 young children (0-6 years)	0.11	0.24	0.12	0.24	0.10	0.14
Working part-time in hospital in 1997						
No children 18 or younger	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.01
2 young children (0-6 years)	0.11	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.09	0.01
Working full time in hospital in 1997						
No children 18 or younger	0.11	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.08	0.01
2 young children (0-6 years)	0.11	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.08	0.03

Table 5. Change in labor supply with the introduction of a flat tax. Percent change in number of worker and hours when a flat tax of 28% is implemented for the whole period 1997-1999.

Sector	Physicians	Nurses
0. Not working	-1.53	0.71
1. Public sector, part time	-1.73	-0.27
2. Public hospital, full time	0.79	0.32
3. Private hospital, part-time	-2.84	-0.81
4. Private hospital, full time	11.43	1.77
5. Public health care, part-time	-2.17	-0.25
6. Public health care, full time	1.98	0.35
7. Private health care, part-time	-3.49	-0.89
8. Private health care, full time	5.05	1.04
9. Other, part- and full time	-0.54	-0.06
Weighted average of total hours	0.76	0.05

Figure 1. Marginal utility of consumption and age





Figure 2. Habit persistence and age



**Figure 3. Medical doctors, 1999. Goodness of fit.
Black observed, grey model**





Figure 4. Nurses, 1999. Goodness of fit. Black observed, grey model.



Appendix A. Tax functions

Table A.1 Tax function, 1997.

Nominal income (NOK) Y	Tax T (NOK)
0-18 198	0
18 198 - 24 709	$0.25Y - 4\ 250$
24 709 – 30 125	$0.078Y$
30 125 – 156 500	$0.302Y - 6\ 748$
156 500 – 233 000	$0.358Y - 15\ 512$
233 000- 262 500	$0.453Y - 37\ 647$
262 500-	$0.495Y - 48\ 672$

Table A.2 Tax function, 1998.

Nominal income (NOK) Y	Tax T (NOK)
0-18 198	0
18 198 - 24 709	$0.25Y - 4\ 250$
24 709 – 31 250	$0.078Y$
31 250– 163 000	$0.302Y - 7\ 000$
163 000 – 248 000	$0.358Y - 16\ 128$
248 000- 272 000	$0.453Y - 39\ 688$
272 000-	$0.495Y - 51\ 112$

Table A.3 Tax function, 1999.

Nominal income (NOK) Y	Tax T (NOK)
0-21 800	0
21 800 - 31 105	$0.25Y - 5\ 350$
31 105 – 33 291	$0.078Y$
33 291 – 166 190	$0.2992Y - 7\ 364$
166 190– 269 100	$0.358Y - 17\ 136$
269 100-	$0.493Y - 53\ 465$

Appendix B. Data

In this appendix the data and estimates for physicians are copied from Andreassen et al (2013).

Table B.1 Sample selection

	Physicians	Nurses
Norwegian physicians and nurses in 2000, original data set	12,376	55,180
Dropped due to missing sector or missing gender	688	1,122
Dropped if not a doctor or nurse in 1997, 1998 or 1999	2,172	9,458
Dropped if not married throughout 1997 to 1999	2,934	16,022
Dropped if occupation not relevant	18	0
Total retained married physicians and married nurses	6,564	28,578

Table B.2 Number of married physicians and married nurses in the different sectors.

	Physicians			Nurses		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
0. Not working	334	377	394	1,051	1,423	1,717
1. Public hospital, part-time	857	792	862	7,404	7,595	7,786
2. “ “ full time	2,750	2,828	2,786	4,729	4,870	4,609
3. Private hospital, part-time	39	34	39	194	226	246
4. “ “ full time	77	86	92	112	112	117
5. Public health care, part-time	785	830	912	7,555	7,376	7,428
6. “ “ full time	402	355	318	3,549	3,517	3,459
7. Private health care, part-time	118	135	131	242	242	293
8. “ “ full time	96	110	121	146	179	204
9. Other	1,106	1,017	909	3,596	3,038	2,719
Total	6,564	6,564	6,564	28,578	28,578	28,578

Table B.3 Average weekly hours across sectors. Married physicians and married nurses.

	Physicians			Nurses		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
1. Public hospital, part-time	20.0	19.1	18.7	21.8	21.4	20.9
2. “ “ full time	40.0	39.9	39.3	39.9	39.9	39.2
3. Private hospital, part-time	19.1	20.2	18.5	18.7	18.9	18.7
4. “ “ full time	42.2	41.9	42.1	42.5	42.3	42.3
5. Public health care, part-time	16.7	15.7	15.6	21.4	21.1	20.9
6. “ “ full time	40.5	40.6	40.6	39.7	39.7	39.5
7. Private health care, part-time	14.6	13.2	13.9	19.0	18.3	18.4
8. “ “ full time	42.3	42.6	42.8	42.3	42.8	42.5
9. Other	29.3	26.7	26.2	28.9	27.7	27.6

Table B.4 The distribution between short part-time and long part-time among married nurses. Per cent.

	Short part-time (less than 20 hours week)			Long part-time 20-29 hours a week		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
	1. Public hospital, part-time	21.0	23.2	25.0	79.0	76.8
3. Private hospital, part-time	52.1	42.5	44.3	47.9	57.5	55.7
5. Public health care, part-time	24.3	25.8	27.3	75.7	74.2	72.7
7. Private health care, part-time	51.7	49.6	49.1	48.3	50.4	50.9
9. Other*	14.1	16.5	18.1	49.4	45.7	46.1

*: Sector 9 includes full-time

Table B.5 Mean of the explanatory variables for married physicians and married registered nurses.

	Physicians			Nurses		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
Female	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.94	0.94	0.94
Age	45	46	47	43	44	45
Age squared	2,108	2,199	2,292	1,902	1,988	2,077
No. children younger than 7 years	0.68	0.58	0.49	0.61	0.52	0.44
No. children 7-18 years of age	1.01	1.03	1.04	0.95	0.97	0.98
Spouse working in health sector	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.13	0.13	0.13
Has a side job	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.06
Works "turnus" (internship) ⁷	0.03	0.01	0.00	-	-	-
Number observations	6,564	6,564	6,564	28,578	28,578	28,578

Table B.6 Mean consumption for married physicians and married nurses by sector. Norwegian kroner.

	Physicians			Nurses		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
0. Not working	234,008	208,758	230,922	154,233	207,313	228,687
1. Public hospital, part-time	376,104	347,365	366,002	247,612	308,821	330,624
2. " " full time	457,517	444,162	467,571	310,696	379,912	408,697
3. Private hospital, part-time	375,572	370,105	370,429	253,758	308,453	337,562
4. " " full time	514,895	497,835	556,823	315,138	382,632	415,413
5. Public health care, part-time	334,460	308,563	332,590	245,368	306,601	330,230
6. " " " full time	448,288	439,211	467,161	310,529	379,140	407,684
7. Private health care, part-time	325,550	304,015	330,991	247,038	305,830	326,544
8. " " " full time	446,135	446,595	497,167	309,615	373,088	407,585
9. Other	399,800	368,367	394,853	273,183	333,602	359,893

⁷ It is mandatory for all physicians to work their final year of studying medicine as an apprentice doctor in a given, often rural, location.

Table B.7 Mean leisure for married physicians and married nurses by sector. Per cent of available time.

	Physicians			Nurses		
	1997	1998	1999	1997	1998	1999
0. Not working	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
1. Public hospital, part-time	78.1%	79.1%	79.4%	75.9%	76.4%	76.9%
2. “ “ full time	56.2%	56.2%	56.9%	56.3%	56.3%	57.0%
3. Private hospital, part-time	79.1%	77.9%	79.8%	79.5%	79.3%	79.5%
4. “ “ full time	53.7%	54.1%	53.9%	53.4%	53.7%	53.6%
5. Public health care, part-time	81.7%	82.9%	82.9%	76.5%	76.7%	77.0%
6. “ “ “ full time	55.6%	55.5%	55.5%	56.5%	56.5%	56.7%
7. Private health care, part-time	84.0%	85.6%	84.7%	79.2%	79.9%	79.8%
8. “ “ “ full time	53.7%	53.3%	53.1%	53.7%	53.1%	53.4%
9. Other	68.0%	70.7%	71.3%	68.4%	69.5%	69.7%

Appendix C. Observed transition rates for nurses, transition rates for physicians are given in Andreassen et al (2013)

Table. C.1 Transitions of married nurses from 1997 to 1998. Number of individuals.

	Hospitals					Primary care				Other	Total
	Not	Public		Private		Public		Private			
	work ing 0.	part time 1.	full time 2.	part time 3.	full time 4.	part time 5.	full time 6.	part time 7.	full time 8.		
0. Not working	624	124	37	6	0	126	7	8	2	117	1,051
1. Publ. hospitals, part time	245	5,646	878	17	11	270	61	29	11	236	7,404
2. Publ. hospitals, full time	39	922	3,552	9	4	53	52	3	6	89	4,729
3. Priv. hospitals, part time	9	12	4	124	16	18	5	2	0	4	194
4. Priv. hospitals, full time	3	4	4	32	59	4	2	1	1	2	112
5. Publ. primary care, part time	295	237	91	24	12	5,846	721	28	14	287	7,555
6. Publ. primary care, full time	47	59	40	4	3	762	2,512	5	6	111	3,549
7. Priv. primary care, part time	11	21	10	5	1	26	5	121	30	12	242
8. Priv. primary care, full time	4	2	5	0	2	4	4	23	100	2	146
9. Other	146	568	249	5	4	267	148	22	9	2,178	3,596
Total	1,423	7,595	4,870	226	112	7,376	3,517	242	179	3,038	28,578

Note: The column to the left gives the states in 1997. Bold value indicates that the individual does not change state.

Table. C.2 Transitions of married nurses from 1998 to 1999. Number of individuals.

	Hospitals					Primary care				Other	Total
	Not	Public		Private		Public		Private			
	work ing 0.	part time 1.	full time 2.	part time 3.	full time 4.	part time 5.	full time 6.	part time 7.	full time 8.		
0. Not working	872	133	35	9	3	186	12	13	2	158	1,423
1. Publ. hospitals, part time	296	5,852	729	23	7	327	78	35	11	237	7,595
2. Publ. hospitals, full time	45	1,043	3,506	6	8	81	74	6	14	87	4,870
3. Priv. hospitals, part time	5	22	6	140	16	19	10	0	0	8	226
4. Priv. hospitals, full time	1	2	6	27	71	3	1	0	1	0	112
5. Publ. primary care, part time	310	297	91	26	5	5,685	652	37	17	256	7,376
6. Publ. primary care, full time	45	50	93	7	5	764	2,433	7	16	97	3,517
7. Priv. primary care, part time	9	19	2	1	0	30	9	137	18	17	242
8. Priv. primary care, full time	1	3	4	0	0	6	8	35	118	4	179
9. Other	133	365	137	7	2	327	182	23	7	1,855	3,038
Total	1,717	7,786	4,609	246	117	7,428	3,459	293	204	2,719	28,578

Note: The column to the left gives the states in 1998. Bold value indicates that the individual does not change state.

Table. C.3 Transitions of married nurses from 1997 to 1998. Shares.

	Hospitals					Primary care				Other	Total
	Not	Public		Private		Public		Private			
	work ing	part time	full time	part time	full time	part time	full time	part time	full time		
0.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	Total	
0. Not working	0.59	0.12	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.11	1.00
1. Publ. hospitals, part time	0.03	0.76	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.00
2. Publ. hospitals, full time	0.01	0.20	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	1.00
3. Priv. hospitals, part time	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.64	0.08	0.09	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.02	1.00
4. Priv. hospitals, full time	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.29	0.53	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	1.00
5. Publ. primary care, part time	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.77	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.04	1.00
6. Publ. primary care, full time	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.00
7. Priv. primary care, part time	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.50	0.12	0.05	1.00
8. Priv. primary care, full time	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.16	0.68	0.01	1.00
9. Other	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.61	1.00

Note: The column to the left gives the states in 1997. Bold value indicates that the individual does not change state.

Table. C.4 Transitions of married nurses from 1998 to 1999. Shares

	Hospitals					Primary care				Other	Total
	Not	Public		Private		Public		Private			
	work ing	part time	full time	part time	full time	part time	full time	part time	full time		
0.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	Total	
0. Not working	0.61	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.11	1.00
1. Publ. hospitals, part time	0.04	0.77	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.00
2. Publ. hospitals, full time	0.01	0.21	0.72	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	1.00
3. Priv. hospitals, part time	0.02	0.10	0.03	0.62	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.04	1.00
4. Priv. hospitals, full time	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.24	0.63	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	1.00
5. Publ. primary care, part time	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.77	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.03	1.00
6. Publ. primary care, full time	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.69	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.00
7. Priv. primary care, part time	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.04	0.57	0.07	0.07	1.00
8. Priv. primary care, full time	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.20	0.66	0.02	1.00
9. Other	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.61	1.00

Note: The column to the left gives the states in 1998. Bold value indicates that the individual does not change state.

Appendix D. Wage equations and selection effects for nurses, for physicians see Andreassen et al (2013).

We estimate wage equations for all individuals for the three years 1997, 1998 and 1999. The wage equations for physicians are documented in Andreassen et al (2013). The wage equations for nurses are documented below. We take sample selection into account by including the predicted choice probabilities as explanatory variables in the wage equations. These probabilities were the predictions resulting from a simple multinomial logit estimation of sector choice. We show the mean of the explanatory variables used in the estimation of the choice probabilities in Table D.1. The estimates of the choice probabilities are given in Table D.2 and the resulting average predicted probabilities are given in Tables D.3, along with the means of the other variables used in the wage equations. The logit estimations were done on all nurses in a given year, while the wage equations were estimated on all working nurses with observations of wage income. The estimates of the wage equations are given in Table D.5. The wage equations for all nine work sectors have been estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood, allowing for correlation between the different wages. The parameters σ_1 to σ_9 are the variance parameters mentioned in the main paper, and the parameters κ_1 to κ_9 are the parameters allowing for correlation between sectors. As can be seen from the tables these correlation factors are not found to be significant, indicating that there is not much residual correlation between the different wages after correcting for the other explanatory variables. In general being a woman reduces wages, while wages increase with age. Table D.6 shows the mean and predicted hourly wages for nurses and derived from predictions using the estimated wage equations reported above. Table D.7 shows the predicted wages for physicians based on the wage equations documented in Andreassen et. al. (2013). The wages for doctors are higher and vary more than the wages of nurses.

Table D.1. Mean of the explanatory variables for the logit estimation. All nurses.

	1997	1998	1999
Female	0.93	0.93	0.92
Birthyear	1940	1940	1941
Married	0.70	0.66	0.66
No. children younger than 7 years	0.60	0.52	0.43
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	0.72	0.72	0.71
Less than 16 years of education	0.83	0.81	0.75
16 or more years of education	0.14	0.16	0.21
Missing education	0.03	0.04	0.04
Spouse working in health sector	0.09	0.09	0.09
Income of spouse, NOK	76,689	79,613	83,498
Number observations	44,600	47,793	51,874

Table D.2. Part 1. Logit estimates of choice of sector and hours (job type). Nurses 1997 – 1999.

	1997		1998		1999	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
1. Public hospital, part time						
Female	-0.14	0.1342	-0.06	0.1173	-0.12	0.0996
Birthyear	-0.07 ***	0.0031	-0.08 ***	0.0027	-0.09 ***	0.0023
Married	0.46 ***	0.0840	0.33 ***	0.0624	0.45 ***	0.0574
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.41 ***	0.0340	-0.44 ***	0.0313	-0.46 ***	0.0308
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.01	0.0313	0.18 ***	0.0283	0.28 ***	0.0273
16 or more years of education	0.22 **	0.0922	0.12	0.0717	0.27 ***	0.0603
Missing education	-0.98 ***	0.1002	-1.28 ***	0.0847	-1.81 ***	0.0724
Spouse working in health sector	0.39 ***	0.1110	0.40 ***	0.0952	0.42 ***	0.0888
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-0.16	0.4830	-0.10	0.2480	-0.16	0.2150
Constant	135.1 ***	6.0983	153.0 ***	5.1505	168.0 ***	4.5298
2. Public hospital, fulltime						
Female	-1.04 ***	0.1324	-1.17 ***	0.1147	-1.04 ***	0.0982
Birthyear	-0.06 ***	0.0032	-0.07 ***	0.0027	-0.07 ***	0.0024
Married	0.49 ***	0.0880	0.04	0.0649	0.17 ***	0.0602
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.90 ***	0.0364	-1.02 ***	0.0345	-1.12 ***	0.0353
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.33 ***	0.0329	-0.15 ***	0.0298	-0.01	0.0288
16 or more years of education	0.90 ***	0.0918	0.64 ***	0.0716	0.32 ***	0.0616
Missing education	-1.40 ***	0.1087	-1.69 ***	0.0932	-1.96 ***	0.0779
Spouse working in health sector	0.75 ***	0.1127	0.67 ***	0.0967	0.77 ***	0.0903
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-3.48 ***	0.5320	0.06	0.2580	-0.16	0.2270
Constant	122.1 ***	6.1379	144.2 ***	5.2216	146.1 ***	4.6024
3. Private hospital, part time						
Female	-0.24	0.2705	-0.03	0.2713	-0.14	0.2318
Birthyear	-0.08 ***	0.0076	-0.10 ***	0.0070	-0.09 ***	0.0061
Married	0.48 **	0.2033	0.73 ***	0.1640	0.80 ***	0.1529
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.60 ***	0.0796	-0.67 ***	0.0779	-0.67 ***	0.0794
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.21 ***	0.0744	-0.01	0.0654	0.12	0.0603
16 or more years of education	0.41 **	0.1884	0.24	0.1628	0.34 ***	0.1285
Missing education	-1.86 ***	0.4239	-1.91 ***	0.3672	-2.33 ***	0.3446
Spouse working in health sector	0.48 **	0.2288	0.38	0.2105	0.36	0.2001
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-0.31	1.1800	0.07	0.6080	-0.16	0.5380
Constant	154.4 ***	14.7357	196.1 ***	13.4715	182.4 ***	11.8952
4. Private hospital, fulltime						
Female	-0.73 ***	0.2622	-0.92 ***	0.2436	-0.76 ***	0.2589
Birthyear	-0.09 ***	0.0086	-0.09 ***	0.0081	-0.08 ***	0.0083
Married	0.66 **	0.2575	0.31	0.2066	0.41 *	0.2165
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.84 ***	0.0967	-1.03 ***	0.1127	-0.95 ***	0.1316
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.59 ***	0.1071	-0.24 ***	0.0922	0.07	0.0858
16 or more years of education	0.63 ***	0.2126	0.72 ***	0.1766	0.49 ***	0.1697
Missing education	-1.90 ***	0.4644	-2.36 ***	0.5132	-2.48 ***	0.5131
Spouse working in health sector	0.47	0.2848	0.64	0.2536	0.65	0.2559
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-2.50	1.7800	-1.19	0.9210	0.15	0.7550
Constant	177.4 ***	16.6418	173.5 ***	15.6853	147.2 ***	16.0066
5. Public health care, part time						
Female	0.17	0.1386	0.02	0.1204	0.16	0.1040
Birthyear	-0.03 ***	0.0031	-0.05 ***	0.0027	-0.06 ***	0.0023
Married	1.05 ***	0.0855	0.51 ***	0.0632	0.60 ***	0.0580
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.21 ***	0.0345	-0.25 ***	0.0317	-0.26 ***	0.0311
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	0.12 ***	0.0313	0.26 ***	0.0284	0.35 ***	0.0274
16 or more years of education	0.05	0.0932	-0.11	0.0731	0.15 **	0.0612
Missing education	-1.08 ***	0.1046	-1.32 ***	0.0885	-1.71 ***	0.0748
Spouse working in health sector	0.05	0.1127	0.10	0.0969	0.12	0.0907
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-3.69 ***	0.5030	-0.13	0.2470	-0.35	0.2160
Constant	63.6 ***	6.1181	97.5 ***	5.1858	118.5 ***	4.5636

Table D.2. Part 2. Logit estimates of choice of sector and hours (job type). Nurses 1997 – 1999.

	1997			1998			1999		
	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.
6. Public health care, fulltime									
Female	-0.77	***	0.1376	-0.94	***	0.1196	-0.92	***	0.1026
Age	-0.05	***	0.0033	-0.06	***	0.0029	-0.06	***	0.0026
Married	1.22	***	0.0935	0.34	***	0.0694	0.48	***	0.0646
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.75	***	0.0389	-0.78	***	0.0368	-0.84	***	0.0373
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.12	***	0.0337	0.08	***	0.0306	0.22	***	0.0294
16 or more years of education	0.77	***	0.0945	0.59	***	0.0744	0.38	***	0.0644
Missing education	-1.11	***	0.1186	-1.47	***	0.1056	-1.71	***	0.0883
Spouse working in health sector	0.37	***	0.1172	0.38	***	0.1013	0.46	***	0.0947
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-5.97	***	0.5730	0.08		0.2680	-0.02		0.2350
Constant	90.7	***	6.4986	111.4	***	5.5906	119.3	***	4.9660
7. Private health care, part time									
Female	-0.69	***	0.2334	-0.33		0.2314	-0.45	**	0.1954
Age	-0.05	***	0.0073	-0.06	***	0.0064	-0.06	***	0.0057
Married	0.35	*	0.1901	0.11		0.1533	0.33	**	0.1377
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.46	***	0.0777	-0.58	***	0.0788	-0.42	***	0.0733
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.02		0.0656	0.23	***	0.0579	0.37	***	0.0523
16 or more years of education	0.11		0.1899	-0.10		0.1684	0.06		0.1301
Missing education	-1.71	***	0.3938	-1.60	***	0.3039	-1.98	***	0.2706
Spouse working in health sector	0.59	***	0.2015	0.85	***	0.1786	0.63	***	0.1697
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	0.74		0.9870	0.03		0.5920	-0.60		0.5180
Constant	105.2	***	14.1402	120.2	***	12.4772	109.9	***	11.0013
8. Private health care, fulltime									
Female	-0.68	**	0.2916	-0.90	***	0.2500	-0.80	***	0.2178
Age	-0.06	***	0.0092	-0.07	***	0.0083	-0.06	***	0.0072
Married	0.85	***	0.2566	0.88	***	0.2056	0.61	***	0.1844
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.99	***	0.1213	-0.77	***	0.1068	-0.72	***	0.1052
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.28	***	0.0886	0.07		0.0732	0.25	***	0.0664
16 or more years of education	0.91	***	0.1930	0.80	***	0.1605	0.52	***	0.1450
Missing education	-1.43	***	0.4663	-1.98	***	0.5128	-2.11	***	0.3908
Spouse working in health sector	0.74	***	0.2445	0.44		0.2253	0.84	***	0.1944
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-0.80		1.3700	-0.16		0.6930	0.17		0.5880
Constant	124.0	***	17.7236	133.2	***	16.0365	118.0	***	13.9972
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime									
Female	-0.69	***	0.1381	-0.79	***	0.1210	-0.73	***	0.1049
Age	-0.06	***	0.0034	-0.08	***	0.0030	-0.08	***	0.0027
Married	0.59	***	0.0905	0.37	***	0.0702	0.44	***	0.0665
No. children younger than 7 years	-0.49	***	0.0370	-0.49	***	0.0350	-0.51	***	0.0355
No. children 7 to 18 years of age	-0.02		0.0332	0.18	***	0.0307	0.29	***	0.0299
16 or more years of education	0.68	***	0.0946	0.62	***	0.0755	0.65	***	0.0649
Missing education	-1.13	***	0.1182	-1.27	***	0.1047	-1.79	***	0.0980
Spouse working in health sector	-0.07		0.1196	0.05		0.1053	0.31	***	0.0983
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)	-0.18		0.5140	0.08		0.2740	-0.08		0.2460
Constant	116.0	***	6.5752	147.7	***	5.8142	155.0	***	5.2587
<hr/>									
Number observations			44600			47793			51874
Log likelihood			-76350.39			-82394.08			-89426.97
LR chi2(81)			5762.69			6189.43			7190.48
Pseudo R2			0.04			0.04			0.04

*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval

** statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval

* statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval

The base outcome is not working. The base category is a male, unmarried nurse with a registered education of less than 16 years and no children under 19 years of age (and, since unmarried, with no spouse working in the health sector).

Table D.3. Sample selection for logit estimation and estimation of wage equations.

	1997	1998	1999
All nurses, used in logit estimation	44,600	47,793	51,874
Not working	-1,731	-2,460	-3,148
Missing wage income	-2	-3	-3
Working nurses, used in wage equation	42,867	45,330	48,723

Table D.4. Mean of the explanatory variables for the wage equations.

	1997	1998	1999
Female	0.93	0.92	0.92
Birthyear	1940	1940	1940
Less than 16 years of education	0.83	0.81	0.75
16 or more years of education	0.14	0.16	0.22
Missing education	0.03	0.03	0.03
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	0.11	0.11	0.11
Less central and central municipalities	0.39	0.39	0.38
Especially central municipalities	0.50	0.50	0.51
Probability of working at job type 1	0.255	0.263	0.273
Probability of working at job type 2	0.174	0.176	0.167
Probability of working at job type 3	0.007	0.008	0.008
Probability of working at job type 4	0.004	0.004	0.004
Probability of working at job type 5	0.216	0.215	0.221
Probability of working at job type 6	0.111	0.112	0.110
Probability of working at job type 7	0.008	0.008	0.010
Probability of working at job type 8	0.004	0.005	0.006
Probability of working at job type 9	0.121	0.105	0.096
Number observations	42,867	45,330	48,723

Table D.5. Part 1. Estimated coefficients of the wage equations for nurses 1997 – 1999.

	1997			1998			1999		
	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.
1. Public hospital part time									
Female	-0.042	***	0.0089	-0.085	***	0.0102	-0.098	***	0.0063
Age	0.004	***	0.0003	0.006	***	0.0003	0.007	***	0.0002
16 or more years of education	0.049	***	0.0055	0.078	***	0.0049	0.036	***	0.0027
Missing education	0.003		0.0086	0.036	***	0.0083	0.097	***	0.0070
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.035	***	0.0068	-0.026	***	0.0066	-0.014	***	0.0047
Less central and central municipalities	-0.032	***	0.0032	-0.029	***	0.0030	-0.024	***	0.0022
Ln(Pr ₁)	0.036	***	0.0113	0.102	***	0.0134	0.171	***	0.0103
Constant	-3.138	***	0.4831	-5.789	***	0.4746	-8.793	***	0.3805
σ ₁	0.107	***	0.0009	0.104	***	0.0008	0.077	***	0.0006
2. Public hospital fulltime									
Female	-0.033	***	0.0034	-0.032	***	0.0039	-0.039	***	0.0032
Age	0.005	***	0.0001	0.005	***	0.0001	0.006	***	0.0001
16 or more years of education	0.050	***	0.0028	0.056	***	0.0031	0.048	***	0.0024
Missing education	-0.021	***	0.0062	-0.036	***	0.0073	-0.002		0.0056
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.007		0.0048	-0.001		0.0055	-0.024	***	0.0049
Less central and central municipalities	-0.018	***	0.0022	-0.008	***	0.0026	-0.030	***	0.0021
Ln(Pr ₂)	-0.010	***	0.0028	-0.001		0.0033	-0.025	***	0.0027
Constant	-4.349	***	0.2085	-5.523	***	0.2344	-6.360	***	0.1918
σ ₂	0.060	***	0.0006	0.072	***	0.0006	0.060	***	0.0005
3. Private hospital part time									
Female	0.048		0.0861	0.162	*	0.0888	0.005		0.0751
Age	-0.003		0.0029	-0.003		0.0027	0.003		0.0021
16 or more years of education	0.153	***	0.0567	0.123	**	0.0480	-0.005		0.0378
Missing education	-0.332	**	0.1346	-0.080		0.1174	0.031		0.1367
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.109		0.0789	0.085		0.0829	-0.028		0.0664
Less central and central municipalities	-0.024		0.0444	-0.087	**	0.0397	0.003		0.0430
Ln(Pr ₃)	-0.134		0.0983	-0.137	*	0.0835	-0.102		0.0892
Constant	10.367	**	5.1329	10.559	**	4.8613	-1.508		3.6956
σ ₃	0.193	***	0.0094	0.183	***	0.0080	0.193	***	0.0079
4. Private hospital fulltime									
Female	-0.099	***	0.0321	-0.077	**	0.0311	-0.113	***	0.0425
Age	0.006	***	0.0013	0.006	***	0.0011	0.003	***	0.0012
16 or more years of education	0.010		0.0274	-0.051	**	0.0252	-0.015		0.0277
Missing education	-0.015		0.0632	-0.071		0.0866	0.060		0.1113
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.074		0.0639	-0.032		0.0622	-0.017		0.0540
Less central and central municipalities	0.026		0.0292	0.003		0.0281	-0.028		0.0335
Ln(Pr ₄)	0.035		0.0233	0.062	**	0.0262	0.052		0.0490
Constant	-6.745	***	2.4493	-5.818	***	2.0685	-0.968		2.2885
σ ₄	0.081	***	0.0045	0.084	***	0.0047	0.100	***	0.0060
5. Public health care part time									
Female	-0.034	***	0.0088	-0.042	***	0.0086	-0.042	***	0.0069
Age	0.001	***	0.0001	0.002	***	0.0001	0.002	***	0.0001
16 or more years of education	0.020	***	0.0049	0.038	***	0.0049	0.016	***	0.0032
Missing education	-0.001		0.0080	0.009		0.0083	0.039	***	0.0068
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.013	***	0.0037	-0.021	***	0.0038	-0.017	***	0.0031
Less central and central municipalities	-0.016	***	0.0030	-0.025	***	0.0030	-0.017	***	0.0024
Ln(Pr ₅)	0.015	***	0.0048	0.020	***	0.0055	0.032	***	0.0046
Constant	2.143	***	0.2612	1.675	***	0.2631	1.829	***	0.2067
σ ₅	0.087	***	0.0008	0.092	***	0.0008	0.077	***	0.0006

Table D.5. Part 2. Estimated coefficients of the wage equations for nurses 1997 – 1999.

	1997			1998			1999		
	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.	Coef.		Std. Err.
6. Public health care fulltime									
Female	-0.013	***	0.0047	-0.011	**	0.0050	-0.013	***	0.0042
Age	0.002	***	0.0002	0.002	***	0.0002	0.002	***	0.0001
16 or more years of education	0.015	***	0.0036	0.025	***	0.0038	0.022	***	0.0026
Missing education	0.007		0.0068	-0.007		0.0075	0.001		0.0056
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.002		0.0033	-0.005		0.0033	-0.021	***	0.0028
Less central and central municipalities	-0.009	***	0.0028	-0.010	***	0.0028	-0.024	***	0.0024
Ln(Pr ₆)	0.004		0.0058	0.007		0.0082	0.010		0.0063
Constant	1.346	***	0.3292	1.387	***	0.3674	1.748	***	0.2937
σ ₆	0.056	***	0.0007	0.058	***	0.0007	0.050	***	0.0006
7. Private health care part time									
Female	-0.110		0.0816	-0.024		0.0781	-0.093		0.0585
Age	-0.003		0.0021	0.001		0.0020	0.000		0.0017
16 or more years of education	-0.014		0.0786	-0.007		0.0637	-0.033		0.0498
Missing education	-0.257		0.1578	-0.106		0.1115	0.020		0.0995
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.183	**	0.0813	-0.186	**	0.0768	-0.201	***	0.0620
Less central and central municipalities	-0.089	*	0.0459	-0.075	*	0.0452	-0.121	***	0.0373
Ln(Pr ₇)	-0.111		0.0969	-0.067		0.0887	0.018		0.0881
Constant	11.041	***	4.1361	3.296		3.9584	5.404		3.5252
σ ₇	0.230	***	0.0102	0.239	***	0.0102	0.220	***	0.0085
8. Private health care fulltime									
Female	-0.146	***	0.0434	-0.162	***	0.0465	-0.102	**	0.0415
Age	0.001		0.0014	0.002		0.0017	0.005	***	0.0016
16 or more years of education	0.015		0.0309	0.051		0.0385	0.060	**	0.0273
Missing education	0.072		0.0862	0.094		0.1062	-0.115		0.0883
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.037		0.0477	-0.111	**	0.0499	-0.061		0.0426
Less central and central municipalities	-0.076	***	0.0296	-0.066	**	0.0325	-0.073	***	0.0255
Ln(Pr ₈)	0.061		0.0374	0.015		0.0510	-0.048		0.0512
Constant	4.203		2.8733	1.867		3.4974	-5.876	*	3.2886
σ ₈	0.101	***	0.0060	0.126	***	0.0068	0.111	***	0.0055
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime									
Female	-0.067	***	0.0080	-0.044	***	0.0084	-0.035	***	0.0083
Age	0.004	***	0.0002	0.005	***	0.0003	0.006	***	0.0003
16 or more years of education	0.030	***	0.0058	0.007		0.0079	-0.037	***	0.0083
Missing education	-0.028	**	0.0113	-0.008		0.0116	0.040	***	0.0125
Least central municipalities (kommuner)	-0.006		0.0071	-0.004		0.0074	-0.011	*	0.0064
Less central and central municipalities	-0.022	***	0.0041	-0.015	***	0.0047	-0.017	***	0.0043
Ln(Pr ₉)	0.026	**	0.0120	0.098	***	0.0180	0.172	***	0.0204
Constant	-1.999	***	0.4042	-4.331	***	0.5424	-6.097	***	0.4995
σ ₉	0.091	***	0.0011	0.098	***	0.0012	0.087	***	0.0011
κ ₁	0.000		0.0021	0.000		0.0020	0.000		0.0015
κ ₂	0.000		0.0020	0.000		0.0021	0.000		0.0021
κ ₃	-0.033		0.0485	0.006		0.0438	-0.015		0.0359
κ ₄	0.004		0.0231	-0.001		0.0206	0.002		0.0228
κ ₅	0.000		0.0017	-0.001		0.0017	0.000		0.0014
κ ₆	0.000		0.0018	0.000		0.0017	0.000		0.0016
κ ₇	0.012		0.0488	0.006		0.0390	-0.012		0.0305
κ ₈	0.006		0.0267	-0.005		0.0279	-0.007		0.0236
κ ₉	-0.001		0.0027	0.000		0.0031	-0.001		0.0030
Number observations			42867			45330			48723
Log likelihood			-188149.7			-204877.1			-211026.2

*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval

** statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval

* statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval

The base category is a male nurse with a registered education of less than 16 years and living in an especially centralized region.

Table D6. Mean and median predicted hourly wages for nurses. Norwegian kroner.

	1997			1998			1999		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median
1. Public hospital part time									
Observed	125	63.02	113	134	66.78	122	132	59.66	122
Predicted	116	7.00	116	126	8.22	126	126	7.11	126
2. Public hospital fulltime									
Observed	115	15.56	115	123	19.18	125	128	17.06	130
Predicted	115	6.81	115	125	8.68	124	128	9.12	128
3. Private hospital part time									
Observed	161	112.12	132	154	66.48	129	158	71.09	137
Predicted	150	17.07	148	148	15.99	146	153	15.67	152
4. Private hospital fulltime									
Observed	112	19.57	111	121	19.90	123	127	24.65	130
Predicted	112	7.55	111	123	8.22	121	130	8.38	129
5. Public health care part time									
Observed	121	49.37	115	129	51.19	124	130	44.06	126
Predicted	117	4.67	117	126	5.77	126	127	4.86	127
6. Public health care fulltime									
Observed	115	13.77	117	124	15.55	126	128	14.09	129
Predicted	117	3.57	117	126	4.21	126	129	4.06	129
7. Private health care part time									
Observed	144	77.24	118	145	65.40	129	144	70.44	129
Predicted	140	18.65	138	149	18.55	148	145	16.80	144
8. Private health care fulltime									
Observed	111	21.73	114	112	25.66	115	121	27.19	121
Predicted	113	8.23	113	116	10.25	115	122	9.61	121
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime									
Observed	119	47.15	115	128	53.78	122	129	48.70	125
Predicted	116	6.51	116	125	7.77	125	127	7.86	127

Table D.7. Mean and median predicted hourly wages for physicians. Norwegian kroner.

	1997			1998			1999		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median
1. Public hospital part time									
Observed	203	136.53	166	205	166.60	172	191	145.88	169
Predicted	186	33.23	180	182	30.74	176	174	27.15	168
2. Public hospital fulltime									
Observed	186	48.98	176	190	47.70	181	183	37.44	181
Predicted	180	16.94	179	185	16.44	184	181	14.88	180
3. Private hospital part time									
Observed	201	132.19	173	214	79.50	188	198	81.92	173
Predicted	187	18.69	189	212	59.92	203	191	24.34	187
4. Private hospital fulltime									
Observed	226	65.78	217	228	77.49	206	243	83.62	221
Predicted	223	27.00	223	226	24.76	227	242	30.55	238
5. Public health care part time									
Observed	156	59.00	157	162	71.74	166	160	57.43	166
Predicted	158	11.55	158	166	12.84	166	165	13.34	164
6. Public health care fulltime									
Observed	160	30.63	166	167	37.82	172	169	34.16	172
Predicted	166	10.51	166	174	15.90	173	175	11.89	175
7. Private health care part time									
Observed	168	50.18	160	188	148.40	169	192	120.98	169
Predicted	164	10.35	163	186	20.11	185	183	17.82	182
8. Private health care fulltime									
Observed	155	63.54	147	167	70.56	158	188	89.08	174
Predicted	157	20.71	151	172	27.81	172	191	35.47	184
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime									
Observed	168	67.00	166	167	59.88	169	169	62.31	169
Predicted	168	17.62	166	169	16.30	168	171	16.70	170