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Assessing physician productivity following Norwegian hospital reform: a panel and data envelopment analysis

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ABSTRACT

Background:
Although health care reforms may improve efficiency at the macro level, less is known regarding their effects on the utilization of health care personnel. Following the 2002 Norwegian hospital reform, we studied the productivity of the physician workforce and the effect of personnel mix on this measure in all nineteen Norwegian hospitals from 2001 to 2013.

Methods:
We used panel analysis and non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to study physician productivity defined as patient treatments per full-time equivalent (FTE) physician. Resource variables were FTE and salary costs of physicians, nurses, secretaries, and other personnel. Patient metrics were number of patients treated by hospitalization, daycare, and outpatient treatments, as well as corresponding diagnosis-related group (DRG) scores accounting for differences in patient mix. Research publications and the fraction of residents/FTE physicians were used as proxies for research and physician training.

Results:
The number of patients treated increased by 47% and the DRG scores by 35%, but there were no significant increases in any of the activity measures per FTE physician. Total DRG per FTE physician declined by 6% (p < 0.05). In the panel analysis, more nurses and secretaries per FTE physician correlated positively with physician productivity, whereas physician salary was neutral. In 2013, there was a 12%–80% difference between the hospitals with the highest and lowest physician productivity in the differing treatment modalities. In the DEA, cost efficiency did not change in the study period, but allocative efficiency decreased significantly. Bootstrapped estimates indicated that the use of physicians was too high and the use of auxiliary nurses and secretaries was too low.

Conclusions:
Our measures of physician productivity declined from 2001 to 2013. More support staff was a significant variable for predicting physician productivity. Personnel mix developments in the study period were unfavorable with respect to physician productivity.

Keywords: Norway; Physician productivity; Personnel mix; Health care reform; Panel analysis; Data envelopment analysis.
Introduction

The success of modern medicine may in fact become its most serious challenge. Supported by accelerating technological developments, modern medicine is pushing frontiers at increasing speeds. These rapid advancements may exceed the capacities of economic and human resources available in the future. Novel treatments for new patient groups that seemed impossible a few years ago, along with increasing complexity and specialization, have resulted in a growing demand for health personnel. With the limited workforce and labor supply confronting most developed health care systems, the continued rapid development of medicine may not be sustainable (Cooper, 2004; Simoens & Hurst, 2006; Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2009, 2010; Williams, Sun, Ross, & Thomas, 2010).

The need to improve efficiency is therefore urgent. To cope with economic challenges, many financial, political, and organizational investments have been made in most developed health care systems in recent decades (Busse, Schreyogg, & Smith, 2008; Magnussen, 2009; Oliver & Mossialos, 2005; Rickman & McGuire, 1999; Rumbold, 2015; Tuohy, 1999; Wiley, 2005; Wilsford, 1994). In 2002, aiming to reduce political interference, a Norwegian hospital reform transformed hospitals into enterprises owned by the government but with full autonomy. One of the major goals was to utilize personnel more efficiently by granting hospitals the power to negotiate the salaries of their own staff members and to decide on their own personnel strategies (E. Biorn, Hagen, T. P., Iversen, T., Magnussen, J., 2010; Tiemann & Schreyogg, 2012). The intention was to create solutions that would stimulate and reward personnel—physicians in particular—for increasing their competence and clinical efficiency, based on the needs of individual institutions.

Hospital productivity and efficiency have been studied extensively at the institutional level, both within individual health care systems and across different national systems. The approaches taken by these studies vary, with some using advanced techniques such as data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and others relying on less advanced techniques (Castelli, Street, Verzulli, & Ward, 2015; Hollingsworth, 2008; Storfa & Wilson, 2015; Varabyova & Schreyogg, 2013). Some studies have examined efficiency within particular specialties and at the individual level (Askildsen, 2006; Bloor, Maynard, & Freemantle, 2004; Laudicella, Olsen, & Street, 2010; Romley, Goldman, & Sood, 2015; Schreyogg, 2008; Tiemann, 2008)). However, the productivity of health personnel is difficult to assess because of the multiple tasks of patient treatment, teaching, and research, and because of differences among specialties regarding diversity in patient treatments and care levels. No single measure can fully reflect this, and we are often left with macro parameters and proxies, such as billing and reimbursement. Furthermore, because productivity is only one aspect of health care systems, it has been suggested that productivity measures should be related to quality and health outcomes (Menachemi, Yeager, Welty, & Manzella, 2015; Romley et al., 2015; Sandy, Haltson, Metfessel, & Reese, 2015; Stecker & Schroeder, 2013). However, this may be challenging at the institutional level, where multiple treatment procedures and patient groups are pooled, and past work has found that the link between hospital efficiency and quality varies from a positive association to more mixed results (Heijink et al., 2015; Hussey, Wertheimer, & Mehrotra, 2013; Kittelsen et al., 2015; Menachemi et al., 2015; Romley et al., 2015; Romley, Jena, O'Leary, & Goldman, 2013; Stukel et al., 2012; Yasaitis, Fisher, Skinner, & Chandra, 2009).

Complex scientific results from DEA or SFA, based on proxies, are not everyday statistics known to health personnel and therefore may have limited impact at the bedside. Hypothetically, measures describing the number of patients to whom the personnel provide service may spark action among “the white coats” in everyday practice and have a supplemental value, despite not having the scientific basis as more advanced techniques. A report from the National Health Service (NHS) Institute revealed that patient admissions and
completed consulting episodes per consultant varied by over 100% across different NHS trusts in England (Aragon, Castelli, & Gaughan, 2015; Castelli et al., 2015; Street & Castelli, 2014). If such differences are real, there would be a substantial gain if the lower-level performers could operate at the average level.

A simple description of productivity is the relation between input and output. The input of health personnel resources may be established through measures of the workforce or salary, whereas the assessment of output is more complex. Metrics such as the number of hospital admissions, daycare treatments, and outpatient consultations are not sufficient alone, but, as a group, they may cover differing pieces of a complex puzzle. However, the large degree of variations between different patient treatments and care levels are not covered. To compensate for this, researchers have used measures thought to reflect some of this variation, such as diagnosis-related groups (DRG), health care resource groups, or relative value units (E. Biorn, Hagen, T. P., Iversen, T., Magnussen, J., 2010; Castelli et al., 2015; Kentros & Barbato, 2013).

The extent of physician services available for patient treatment is the crucial issue, and the utilization of physician resources is therefore important. This, in turn, may depend on organizational perspectives as well as personnel mix (Bank & Gage, 2015; Greene, 2015; Johnson, Shah, Rechner, & King, 2008; Newhouse & Sinaiko, 2007; Rodysill, 2003; Sandbaek, Helgheim, Larsen, & Fasting, 2014; Sunshine, Hughes, Meghea, & Bhargavan, 2010). We undertook this study to examine physician productivity using panel analysis with limited Information maximum likelihood (LIML) regression and DEA analysis based on metrics of patients treated combined with health personnel indicators.

**Background**
In 2002, all public Norwegian hospitals were transferred from a system of county ownership to central government ownership (Hagen & Kaarboe, 2006). The aim was to increase hospital efficiency by providing greater autonomy with respect to planning, budgeting, and workforce policies. The reform aimed to define hospitals’ economic responsibilities more precisely and to implement remuneration for personnel that would stimulate productivity, especially among physicians (E. Biorn, Hagen, T. P., Iversen, T., Magnussen, J., 2010; Magnussen, 2009; Verzulli, 2011). Hospitals were restructured as health enterprises comprising 1–8 of the previous hospitals and organized into five regional health authorities, which were reduced to four in 2005. During our study period (2001–2013), Norwegian hospitals consisted of five regional university hospitals (the most specialized hospitals, two of which were merged in 2010), 11 central hospitals (two with university functions), and four local hospitals. Norwegian health care is mainly funded by general taxation, and hospital care is paid through a mixture of global funding and activity-based funding (ABF), which is based mainly on the DRG system. Hospitals receive targeted compensation for teaching and research.

**Aims and objectives**

The current study had three aims. First, we investigated whether the utilization of the physician workforce, as assessed by indicators of patient treatment volumes in relation to the number of physicians, has improved since the 2002 hospital reform. Because we did not study the period before the reform was implemented, we had no ambition to examine causality. Second, using panel analysis with LIML estimations (Anderson, 1949) and the non-parametric DEA method for estimating a variable returns to scale cost function (Banker, Charnes, & Cooper, 1984; Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978), we analyzed the relationship between the relative personnel mix (nurses, auxiliary nurses, and medical secretaries) and
physician productivity. Third, we examined whether the new remuneration structure implemented with the reform translates into physician efficiency (Bloor et al., 2004; Devlin & Sarma, 2008). In our analyses, we used parameters reflecting patient treatment, research activity, and teaching and related these measures to workforce resources.

**Methods**

**Data sources**

The dataset covered the period from 2001, the last year before the reform was implemented, to 2013. All hospital enterprises in Norway (N = 19) were included, and we had data from each hospital each year. Hospital mergers during this period were handled by aggregating the data in the premerger period to the hospital structure in the post-merger period.

Data on workforce resources and salaries were obtained from The Employers Organization Specter and Statistics Norway and are described in Table 1. Salary data consisted of payment for regular work, casual overtime, and on-call services. Activity data were obtained from the Norwegian Patient Register and consisted of the total number of treatments, including hospitalization, daycare, and outpatient consultations and the corresponding DRG scores. The DRG system groups patients into categories with similar use of resources and reflects the total costs for patient treatment episodes. The DRG unit price is an estimated average cost of all patients at the national level and is constructed for calculation of ABF reimbursement. In addition to personnel costs, DRG scores include overhead costs, medications, blood, implants and so on, and are therefore not an exact measure of patient-related workload in relation to personnel productivity.

| Table 1. Variables included in the final regressions |
LIML=Limited information maximum information regression. DEA: Data envelopment analysis. DRG: Diagnosis-related groups. FTE: Full time equivalents of personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Dependent in LIML</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DRG/Physician</td>
<td>Sum of DRG scores from hospitalization, day treatment and outpatient consultations per FTE Physician</td>
<td>NPR for activity, Physician FTE from Specter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician Salary</td>
<td>Average total salary per physician</td>
<td>Specter and Statistics Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician Salary Lagged</td>
<td>Average total salary per physician the year before</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE Nurses/Physician</td>
<td>Sum of FTE of Nurses per Physician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE Secretaries/Physician</td>
<td>Sum of FTE of Secretaries per Physician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Physician</td>
<td>Sum of FTE of Other staff per Physician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Fraction</td>
<td>Sum of FTE Resident per Total FTE Physicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/Physician</td>
<td>Total Research Points per Physician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Number of Beds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Squared</td>
<td>Number of Beds Squared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regressors in LIML Analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor inputs: FTE for each personnel group: Physicians, Nurses, Auxiliary nurses, Secretaries and Other staff</td>
<td>FTE estimates based on hours worked including overtime</td>
<td>Specter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input prices:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage cost per FTE in each personnel group</td>
<td>Sum of wage costs including pension and social costs in each group for all FTE, divided by the FTE estimated above.</td>
<td>Statistics Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-labor inputs</td>
<td>Total operating costs excluding capital costs minus total wage costs (input price normalized to 1).</td>
<td>Statistics Norway</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DRG scores do not reflect research or education, and hospitals use a substantial amount of their resources for teaching and research. Such activities may influence the workload of the personnel. Hospital residents need considerable coaching and training, which may influence the productivity of the physician staff (Farnan, Johnson, Meltzer, Humphrey, &
Arora, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; W. M. McDonnell, P. Carpenter, K. Jacobsen, & H. A. Kadish, 2015; Medin et al., 2011). We used the balance between residents and senior consultants (resident fraction) to examine this factor. As a proxy for research, for each year examined, we calculated the publication score (Bonastre, le Vaillant, & de Pouvourville, 2011; Linna, Hakkinen, & Linnakko, 1998; Medin et al., 2011), which is a bibliometric measure taking into account the impact-weighted number of journal articles and the number of doctoral theses completed each year. Such data were only available for 2003–2013 and were extrapolated using linear regression for 2001 and 2002 for use in the multivariate analyses.

We included the number of hospital beds (both as a linear and as a quadratic term) to account for scale effects (Aragon et al., 2015). These data were obtained from Statistics Norway. Because the hospitals differed in their scope of emergency capacity, we included fixed effects for each hospital enterprise.

**Analytical approach and statistics**

We used Farrell’s efficiency concepts (Farrell, 1957) to define productivity as

\[
\text{Productivity} = \frac{\text{Output}}{\text{Input}},
\]

where technical productivity is measured as the total DRG score per full-time equivalent (FTE) physician. The variables showing significance in Pearson correlations were included in the multivariate analyses, and the final regressors are listed in Table 1.

The relationship between productivity and salary raises questions of cause and effect, as increased salary may stimulate improved productivity, and improved productivity may be rewarded by increased salary. Accordingly, salary may be an endogenous variable with respect to productivity, whereas personnel mix, research, and education are not. In our final
analyses, we used the LIML procedure to account for the simultaneous structure of the salary–productivity relationship with the following equations:

Productivity = a0 + b1*lagSalary + b2 * Other variables

Salary = c0 + d1*lagProductivity + d2 * Other variables

We constructed three versions of the model. The first model is a time series cross-section model that utilized all available information in the dataset (Model 1). The two other models use fixed effects for hospital, utilizing variation within each hospital over time. In Model 2, we assume that there is a 1-year lag in the effects of salary on productivity and of productivity on salary, whereas salary from the same year is used in Model 3.

To further study physician productivity in relation to the balance of resources and personnel inputs, we used the non-parametric DEA method to estimate a variable returns to scale cost function (Banker et al., 1984; Charnes et al., 1978; Farrell, 1957). We did not intend to study total factor productivity, but rather to focus on the optimal mix of various personnel groups as revealed by the cost function estimates. We included non-labor costs as described in Table 1.

The cost function is defined as the minimum cost necessary to produce a given level of output (e.g., health services) with exogenously given input prices (e.g., wages). Cost functions assume input substitution possibilities so that the use of an input increases if the wages of that group decrease. The DEA method is basically deterministic, and we used bootstrapping methods to calculate the sampling error of the estimates and assess the variance and confidence intervals (Simar & Wilson, 1998, 2000). Bootstrapping is a procedure that draws with replacement from the primary data sample, mimicking the data-generating process of the underlying true model and producing multiple pseudo-estimates that allow for the calculation of the sampling error of the estimates and estimate variance, as well as confidence intervals. The assumption is that we know how the data are generated, and we are therefore able to
calculate how well our estimates reflect the true costs and efficiency levels, conditional on our
data and method. The bootstrapped results are therefore robust with respect to sampling error,
but the bootstrapping procedure does not account for measurement error.

Cost efficiency was decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency (Farrell, 1957). High technical efficiency implies that there is no excess input of resources to obtain a
certain production level, whereas high allocative efficiency indicates that the mix of input
resources is optimized. Allocative efficiency reflects the extent to which the input mix is
optimal by comparing the differing marginal costs when the inputs are varied, based on the
ratio of prices of the inputs.

We used SAS software version 14 for the panel analysis, the Frisch Nonparametric
DEA Program (Frisch Centre, Oslo, Norway), and SPSS (IBM, version 22) for the
comparison of descriptive data using ANOVA.

Results

Descriptive data

To avoid an extensive table with data from all years, we present descriptive data from
2001 and 2013 (Table 2) supplemented with graphs that illustrate developments over time in
some basic variables (Figure 1).

Table 2. Descriptive data on resources, activities, and productivity in 2001 and 2013
Figure 1. The development of selected parameters 2001–2013

a. Total patients treated and total diagnosis-related groups (DRG) score per full time equivalent (FTE) physician. b. Research per FTE physician in regional, central, and local hospitals. c. Nurses and secretaries per FTE physician and resident fraction.
The 47% increase in the total number of patients treated was a consequence of a shift from hospitalized treatment to daycare/outpatient treatment. However, the increase varied from 12% to 92% at individual hospitals. All 19 hospitals reduced the number of hospital beds, and six reduced their volume of hospitalizations. Daycare and outpatient treatment increased in all of the studied hospitals, with a magnitude varying from 15% to 92%. For hospitalized patients, the DRG increased more than the number of patients, whereas the opposite was observed for daycare patients. This may reflect a shift of low-intensity treatment from hospitalization to daycare, leaving only the more complex cases in the hospitalized activity.

The total research scores increased by 41% at the national level, but this differed considerably across individual hospitals (Figure 1b). Regional and university hospitals accounted for 88% of the research activity.

**Physician productivity**

Table 2 shows that the total DRG score per FTE physician decreased by 6% (p < 0.05) from 2001 to 2013, whereas the total number of patients treated per physician increased by 1.4% (26 patients per physician per year, p = 0.40). The difference between the hospitals with the highest and lowest DRG per physician decreased from 104% (213 vs. 104) in 2001 to 77%
(163 vs. 92) in 2013, but this convergence was mainly caused by a reduction in the high scores and not by an overall increase.

The average research score per FTE physician increased from 0.08 to 0.15 for the central hospitals (p < 0.01) but was unchanged for regional and local hospitals (Figure 1b). The DEA showed that cost efficiency varied across the study years, but there was no significant upwards or downwards trend. Decomposition revealed that technical efficiency increased during the first four years but levelled off beginning in 2005. A possible interpretation for this finding is that the use of resources was excessive in relation to the patient treatment generated. Allocative efficiency, in contrast, decreased significantly throughout the study period (Figure 2). This indicates that the balance between multiple input resources deteriorated over the study period. In 2013, technical efficiency was 0.89, and allocative efficiency was 0.83.

Figure 2. Cost efficiency, technical efficiency, and allocative efficiency 2001-2013

Bootstrapped averages by year with 95% confidence intervals (CI)
Variables influencing physician productivity

The results from the LIML regression models are presented in Table 3. The numbers of nurses and secretaries per FTE physician were the strongest correlates of productivity in all analyses, both across and within the hospitals. Figure 3 shows a simple illustration of these relations in 2013; the observations for the other years were similar.

Table 3. Results from panel analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Pr &gt;</th>
<th>t</th>
<th></th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Pr &gt;</th>
<th>t</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.55</td>
<td>42.78</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-70.82</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>&lt;0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician Salary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>Physician Salary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00006</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician Salary Lagged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>Physician Salary Lagged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.02</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE Nurses/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>&lt;0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td>FTE Nurses/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47.63</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE Secretaries/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-40.51</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>FTE Secretaries/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE Other/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>FTE Other/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>89.03</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>&lt;0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Fraction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-31.63</td>
<td>40.19</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Fraction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>16.48</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-38.48</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>Research/Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Squared</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale Squared</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.00001</td>
<td>0.00007</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of other types of personnel per FTE physician also correlated significantly with productivity. This might be an effect of hospital size, but including this variable as scale...
and scale squared showed that the scale factor of hospital size converged, with a statistical optimum of approximately 350 beds. A negative effect of a higher resident fraction in the univariate analysis was eliminated in Model 1, and residents were shown to have a positive effect on productivity in Models 2 and 3. Also, a negative correlation between the fraction of outpatient consultations and physician productivity in the univariate analysis ($r = -0.34$, $p < 0.01$) was eliminated in the panel analysis.

The DEA confirmed the association between physician productivity and personnel mix. However, although declining allocative efficiency indicates that cost savings could be achieved by changing the input mix, this finding does not reveal which inputs are over- or under-utilized. Still, the bootstrapped estimates in Table 4 show that, when comparing the hospitals’ actual 2013 cost shares to the “optimal model” based on the bootstrap, the use of some inputs was not optimal. Allocative efficiency in 2013 would be improved if the use of physicians were reduced so that their cost share was lowered from 17.1% to 14.6%, whereas the cost share of auxiliary nurses, for example, should be increased by 2.1%.

Table 4. Bootstrap estimates of optimal cost shares compared with actual observed shares for different resources in 2001 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price in 2013 NOK (Personnel costs)</th>
<th>Cost shares</th>
<th>Difference (p-val)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Optimal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full time equivalents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physicians 7 108 1 266 14.3 %</td>
<td>15.0 %</td>
<td>0.7 % &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nurses 22 032 687 24.1 %</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>0.0 % ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auxiliary Nurses 4 873 611 4.7 %</td>
<td>5.6% (5.1%-6.3%)</td>
<td>0.8% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretaries 6 196 509 5.0 %</td>
<td>4.9% (4.8%-5.9%)</td>
<td>-0.2% &lt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonmedical staff 23 472 608 22.7</td>
<td>18.3% (17.4%-18.8%)</td>
<td>-4.4% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-labor inputs 18 240 1 000 29.1</td>
<td>32.0% (30.0%-32.9%)</td>
<td>3.0% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physicians 9 852 1 330 17.1 %</td>
<td>14.6% (14.4%-15.2%)</td>
<td>-2.5% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Nurses 25 695 729 24.4 %</td>
<td>24.3% (23.6%-25.0%)</td>
<td>-0.1% ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auxiliary nurses 3 293 631 2.7 %</td>
<td>5.1% (4.5%-5.8%)</td>
<td>2.4% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretaries 5 242 535 3.7 %</td>
<td>4.8% (4.8%-5.7%)</td>
<td>1.1% &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonmedical staff 21 653 672 18.9</td>
<td>18.1% (17.5%-19.2%)</td>
<td>-0.9% &lt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-labor inputs 25 535 1 000 33.2</td>
<td>33.2% (30.9%-34.0%)</td>
<td>0.0% ns</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Physician remuneration
Physician salary correlated negatively with productivity in the univariate analysis in all years, and the hospitals with the largest increase in salary reduced their productivity. A simple illustration of this aspect is shown in Figure 4 a and b. However, the hypothesis that hospitals with higher physician salaries are characterized by lower physician productivity than are those with lower salaries did not reach significance in our Model 1, probably indicating the multifactorial aspect of this relation. The salary from the previous year correlated positively and significantly in the fixed effects model (within hospital analysis), but this was voided by the reciprocal effect of productivity on salary in the LIML analysis. We experimented with different combinations of regular salary, overtime and on-call salary, but without any significant results.

Figure 4. Univariate relation between physician salary and total diagnosis-related (DRG) scores per physician in 2013 (a) and the relation between percent change in salary and productivity 2001-2013 (b).

Discussion

The results of the current study show that, although there was a significant increase in treatment activity in Norwegian hospitals from 2001 to 2013, this increase occurred primarily
because of the use of more physicians and not because of an improvement in physician productivity. Furthermore, differences across Norwegian hospitals of 80% in the total number of patients treated and 64% in the DRG scores per FTE physician present a challenge with respect to overall productivity and should trigger more research. Our findings correspond well to other reports that have revealed that patient admissions and completed consulting episodes per consultant varied by over 100% between NHS trusts in England (Street & Castelli, 2014).

Our most striking result is the effect of personnel mix on physician productivity. The LIML analysis revealed that staffing of both nurses and secretaries correlated significantly with physician productivity, both across and within the studied hospitals. Furthermore, the DEA indicated that, with the current mix of resources, nurse staffing is close to the optimal model, but there is an overuse of physicians of approximately 15% and deficiencies in the use of auxiliary nurses and secretaries of about 89% and 30%, respectively. We interpret this finding as evidence that developments in the study period have resulted in a suboptimal personnel mix.

The substantial change from hospitalization to outpatient treatment makes it difficult to fully assess the development of a complex issue such as physician productivity. This shift in the care level is a factor that may affect our estimates of both the patient mix and the personnel mix, and it is well known that the lower weight assigned to outpatient activities by the DRG system may underestimate real efficiency (Vitikainen, Linna, & Street, 2010). However, we find it unlikely that a 26% reduction in the number of hospitalized treatments and a 3.7% reduction in day treatments per physician may be compensated by an 8.6% increase in outpatient consultations per physician. It is of note that physician productivity increased in several hospitals while it worsened in others. This large variation in the utilization of physician resources among the hospitals parallels similar differences presented in previous reports analyzing efficiency at the institutional level in Norwegian hospitals over
the same period (E. Biorn, Hagen, Iversen, & Magnussen, 2003; E. Biorn, Hagen, T. P., Iversen, T., Magnussen, J., 2010). We conclude that the intention to improve personnel productivity has not yet resulted in the homogenous performance of hospitals with respect to the utilization of the physician workforce. This is also consistent with previous reports from other health care systems (Castelli et al., 2015; Hvenegaard, Street, Sorensen, & Gyrd-Hansen, 2009; Ineveld, Oostrum, Vermeulen, Steenhoek, & Klundert, 2015; Milstein & Kocher, 2014; Street & Castelli, 2014). In fact, in their study of Dutch hospitals, Ineveld et al. (Ineveld et al., 2015) found that the difference between hospitals increased over time.

Although several previous studies have reported that the overall efficiency of Norwegian hospitals improved during our study period, most of this work analyzed data only through 2004. We identified a corresponding improvement in cost efficiency until 2005, but we found no further improvement thereafter. We also found a steady reduction in physician productivity throughout the total period. If efficiency gains are mainly obtained through administrative procedures and reduced staffing in non-medical personnel categories, this may not be a sustainable strategy in the long run (Tiemann & Schreyogg, 2012).

Although DRG score per FTE physician is a rather coarse measurement, it seems to be fairly well related to the overall costs in Norwegian hospitals (Helsedirektoratet, 2013). This is illustrated in Figure 5 for 2013, and similar results were found for all of the years studied. This is an additional indication that physician productivity and, possibly, the corresponding measures for other personnel groups are important in the long-term development of hospital efficiency.

Figure 5. Univariate relation between index of national hospital and total DRG FTE physician.
Several studies have documented the effect of personnel supporting physicians on productivity (Bank & Gage, 2015; Grimshaw, 2012; McDonnell et al., 2015; Rumbold, 2015). The change in personnel balance observed in the present study may be caused by several factors. The shift in care level may have changed the balance between physicians and other health personnel, as daycare and outpatient treatment may require more physicians and less nursing personnel compared with hospitalized treatment. Some of the observed reduction in medical secretary resources may be related to the expected effects of technological solutions that are assumed to reduce secretary work (e.g., voice recognition and electronic patient charts). However, past work has reported that a significant increase in non-medical tasks for physicians casts some uncertainty on the effects of such technological strategies (J. Rosta & Aasland, 2014; J. A. Rosta, OG., 2015). Furthermore, the increasing specialization among physicians may not be reflected to the same extent among nurses.

The effect of resident training on productivity has been extensively studied (Farnan et al., 2008; Harvey, Al Shaar, Cave, Wallace, & Brydon, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Kawano, Nishiyama, & Hayashi, 2014; Zeidel et al., 2005). We found a positive correlation between productivity and the fraction of the total FTE of physicians consisting of residents. This may
reflect that residents in Norwegian hospitals spend a considerable portion of their training time conducting patient treatment.

There have been several reports on the effects of incentives for physicians regarding productivity (Andreae & Freed, 2003; Conrad et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2006). Andreae et al. (2003) found that targeted incentives and remuneration based on relative value units caused a 20% increase in clinical productivity. There was a declared ambition in the Norwegian hospital reform to improve personnel productivity by giving the hospitals freedom to implement more targeted remunerations. We cannot make any conclusions of causality based on the measures we used, but we found little evidence that the new remuneration structure for physicians has translated into improved productivity. One hypothesis may be that collective bargains still prevail despite local negotiations. Targeted incentives should definitely receive more focus in applied settings, seeking remuneration models that are related to the actual health care system as well as social and contextual factors (Wranik & Durier-Copp, 2011).

At what level do health care reforms work?

The crucial question facing health care is whether there will be enough personnel resources to meet future needs, and this question relates especially to physicians. Increasing medical specialization will call for more specialized physicians, who may restrict their medical scope for patient treatment to their own specialties. This, in turn, may increase the need for resources.

Policy makers intend to improve the efficiency of health care systems through their reforms, and an interesting question is whether we should expect an effect of political hospital reforms at the bedside (Davis & Rayburn, 2016). It is possible that a major part of the effect of political reforms is based on improvements in administrative and organizational perspectives. However, even if reforms may have effects on efficiency at the macro level, we need political initiatives that also create changes at the micro level, because improvements
may not be sustained if they do not include an enhancement of the efficiency of the health care workforce (Burwell, 2015; Conrad et al., 2002; Franco, Bennett, & Kanfer, 2002; Lieberman & Allen, 2015; Marshall & Bindman, 2016; McWilliams, Chernew, Landon, & Schwartz, 2015; Milstein & Kocher, 2014; Ryskina & Bishop, 2013).

Two other political initiatives of relevance to our study were implemented in the period. In 1997, ABF was introduced with the intention to improve efficiency. The level of ABF has varied between 30-60%. In 2001, all patients were granted free choice of hospitals combined with the removal of county border barriers. This primarily aimed to reduce long waiting times, and previous research has shown that both the introduction of ABF and the expansion of hospital budgets have been factors in reducing waiting time for elective patients (Hagen & Kaarboe, 2006; Ringard & Hagen, 2011). Although these two initiatives may also have influenced the hospitals’ operational performance, we conclude that physician productivity did not improve during our study period, irrespective of these reforms.

Norway, like several other modern health care systems, will face a significant deficit of health personnel in the future (Roksvaag & Texmon, 2012). For this reason, we believe that there must be a considerably stronger focus on improving workforce productivity at the clinical level. Our data strongly indicate that staffing and personnel mix significantly influences the utilization of health personnel. Accordingly, any reform or change should also stimulate the core personnel, and managerial and organizational efforts, leadership, and economical incentives ought to focus on such goals.

The large differences in physician productivity observed across the hospitals in our study may indicate a considerable potential for improvement. Optimizing hospital staff is essential for improving efficiency, because personnel costs constitute more than 60% of the total expenses. Several factors, such as leadership, the improvement of occupational health, and the reduction of temporary staff and overtime, may contribute to this optimization. In an
interview-based study of managers and clinicians in orthopedics and cardiology in acute hospitals, Bloom et al. (Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van Reenen, 2015) concluded that management quality was favorably correlated with indicators of hospital performance with respect to waiting times, mortality, financial performance, and staff satisfaction. Burns and Muller (Burns & Muller, 2008) also focused on such factors in their review of the literature on hospital/physician collaboration. They found that the characteristic distinguishing between high- and low-performing hospitals was “the level of both hospital executive and physician behavioral skills,” including physicians’ trust in hospital executives, mutual respect and support, communication, physicians’ involvement in clinically related decision making, and hospital executive leadership over time. This finding likely supports the idea that future reforms should promote a united process with professional medical development and system reforms.

Limitations

DRG scores are the official measurement of treatment activity for annual governmental reports of hospital productivity in Norwegian hospitals, but they have limitations as measures of productivity in our context. None of the parameters covers the activity in a complete manner individually, and the extent to which their combination may compensate for this limitation is unclear. As our data show, despite an increase in the number of patients treated per FTE physician, the DRG scores did not increase to the same extent. The DRG system has been adjusted over the study period because of economic considerations and new DRG weights have appeared due to new treatment methods and DRGs for day treatment where there was only hospitalized treatment in 2001. Although these measures may be adequate within each year, comparisons over time may be distorted. An appropriate analysis of this shift should be done for each DRG and is complex. However, when experimenting
with same DRG weights at the macro level for 2001 and 2013, this did not change our main conclusion.

An increasing population of chronically ill patients may cause a shift towards more control and follow-up activities which may require full-scale personnel resources without triggering full DRG reimbursement as new patients do. In addition, the differing combinations of medical activities among the hospitals may cause unequal scores on the variables we have used. We cannot rule out the possibility that assessing more specific characteristics of hospitals could have yielded different results.

Conclusions

Despite several political reforms of the Norwegian hospital sector over the study period, physician productivity as assessed by our measures declined, and we found significant variation in productivity among Norwegian hospitals. These findings must be addressed further by future work if the coming challenges are to be solved. It is obvious that the balance between support staff and the physician workforce may have a significant effect on the utilization of physicians, and the current situation in our data indicates that future planning regarding support staff should have a factual and rational basis. Because there is a great deal of variety in the individual competence and performance of health personnel from clinical, educational, and scientific perspectives, we believe that more individual incentives and fewer collective solutions should be considered in future remuneration negotiations.

References


Askildsen, J. E. H. J. (2006). Wages and work conditions as determinants for physicians’ work decisions. WORKING PAPERS NO 06/06 IN ECONOMICS. UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN. Norway.


Research highlights:

- Physician productivity not improved after health care reform
- Differences across hospitals in productivity reveal large potential for improvement
- Supporting staff for physicians increase physician productivity significantly