Individual and household value of mortality reductions with intrahousehold bargaining
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I derive alternative measures of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and value of statistical life (VSL) related to changes in the supply of a public good affecting mortality for both members of two-person households, when members are selfish, live for at most two periods, and strike efficient Nash bargains over consumption of individual and household goods. I find no systematic bias in letting one household member conduct the (WTP or VSL) valuation on behalf of the household. Publicgood VSL may exceed private-good VSL due to each member attaching (purely selfish) preferences to the event that the other member survives or dies, and to a possible net income potential of the other member when surviving in period 2. When period 2 is a retirement period and household members’ incomes are then fixed, interview surveys tend to overvalue VSL due to ignored negative effects of own survival on government pension budgets.
Value of statistical life; household bargaining; intertemporal allocation models; optimal life insurance
Prosjekt info:Oppdragsgiver: Norges forskningsråd
Frisch prosjekt: 4101 - Økonomi og helse