International Environment Agreements
|Project manager||Rolf Golombek|
|Client project no.|
|Period||1997 - 1999 (ended)|
Project descriptionWe study the optimal design of international environmental agreements with limited participation under different types of market failures. We also study how a country, and a group of countries, should respond to a non-optimal international agreement with limited participation. We will try to answer the following types of questions:
How should international environment agreements be designed when the participating countries have the same type of market failures (including unemployment)? Is it sufficient that the agreement includes only direct regulations of the countries’ emissions, or should the agreement also place restrictions on the participating countries’ environmental policy measures?
Is it possible for a group of countries, for example the Nordic countries, to benefit from co-ordination of their climate policy if the international climate agreement is not optimal designed?
Given that a group of countries will benefit from co-ordination, what kind of co-ordination problems may arise if some of the countries are net-importers of fossil fuels, whereas others are net-exporters?
Suppose Norway has signed a non optimal international environmental agreement. How should the country design its envronmental policy measures?
|Hoel, M. og P. Shapiro||Population Mobility and Transboundary Environmental Problems||2003||Journal of Public Economics 87, 1013-1024|