The labor supply of physicians and nurses
Number | 4107 |
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Project manager | Steinar Strøm |
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Client | HERO - Norges forskningsråd |
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Client project no. | |
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Participants | Maria Laura Di Tommaso |
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Period | 2012 - 2012 (ended) |
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Project description
In this project we study how economic incentives and other attributes of
jobs affect the labor supply of employed physicians and nurses. A dynamic
random utility model, extended to deal with habit persistence, is
estimated on paneldata from the late 1990s. The estimated models are used
to calculate the impact of changes in wage rates and tax structure on
labor supply. In the model nurses as well doctors can choose between
different working loads, offered by the instititutions, and to work in
hospitals and primary health care. The results indicate that the overall
labor supply elasticites are low both for physicians and nurses. However,
these modest responses shadow for stonger responses regarding specific job
types. Thus, an overlall wage increase shift labour away from part-time
jobs in the public and private sector to full time jobs in private
hospitals. The tax reform of 2006 is estimated to give doctors and nurses
incentive to move from part time jobs in the public sector to full time
jobs in the private sector. The reform also give higher benefits to richer
households than to the poor.
Publications
Other publications