|
|
Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance
By Hoel, Michael and Tor Iversen
2002
Journal of Health Economics, No 21, 253-270
|
|
Abstract |
When the insurer has access to information about test status, genetic insurance can handle the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent. |
| JEL Classification:
|
D83, H52, I18 |
| Keywords:
|
Genetic testing, Insurance, Private information, Compulsory/voluntary mix |
| Project:
|
4101 Economics of health
|
| Contact:
|
tor.iversen@samfunnsmed.uio.no |
| |
|
| |
|
Ordering
Publications will be available in full text Adobe Acrobat PDF-files from this server.
Publications printed as articles or book chapters will for copyright reasons not be availbable in full text.
For some documents you may need to download version 4 of the free Acrobat Reader.
Microsoft Internet Explorer has problems opening some documents. In these cases one can right click the link and choose
"Save Target As", and then open the saved file directly in Adobe Acrobat.
Paper versions are available by ordering on +47-22958820, fax +47-22958825, or by email
frisch@frisch.uio.no
Subscribe to our information mailinglist if you want to be noitied of new publications
in one or several of our research fields.
For reports, working papers or reprints from 1998 and previous years while the Frisch Centre was SNF-Oslo, use SNFs WWW publication centre,
(unfortunately only in Norwegian) or Tel: +47-55959500, Fax: +47-55959439, Post: SNF, Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen,
E-mail: publikasjon@snf.no
Full Name: Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research Address: Gaustadalléen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway Telephone: +47-22958810 E-mail: frisch@frisch.uio.no .
Updated
22.05.13, webmaster@frisch.uio.no.
|
|
