

Policies for electrification of cars in the short and long run<sup>☆</sup>Cathrine Hagem<sup>a</sup>, Snorre Kverndokk<sup>b,\*</sup>, Eric Nævdal<sup>c</sup>, Knut Einar Rosendahl<sup>d</sup><sup>a</sup> Research Department, Statistics Norway, Norway<sup>b</sup> Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalléen 21, 0349 Oslo, Norway<sup>c</sup> Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Norway<sup>d</sup> School of Economics and Business, NMBU- Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway

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## ABSTRACT

We study the optimal combination of short and long-lived options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, using electrification of the car fleet as an example. A transition to electric vehicles (EVs) can be incentivized by subsidies on purchases of EVs or on fast chargers. Subsidizing purchases only leads to emissions reductions in the next few years (short-lived static option), whereas investment in fast chargers will reduce abatement costs in several years (long-lived dynamic option). The dynamic option may be socially profitable even if it is more expensive. Numerical simulations confirm the qualitative results of the theory model and point to subsidizing charging stations as the dominate policy. An international permit market affects the combination of static and dynamic abatement. The optimal number of EVs increases with future permit prices, thus making both EV subsidies and charging station subsidies more profitable, but it is relatively more cost-efficient to subsidize charging stations.

## 1. Introduction

The long-term goal in the Paris agreement from 2015 is to keep global warming well below two degrees Celsius, and preferably down to 1.5 degrees. In order to comply with this target, many countries and regions have implemented short- and long-term goals for their emissions. For instance, the EU aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030, while for 2050, the aim is to become carbon neutral.<sup>1</sup> Electrification of the transportation sector and, in particular, the market for privately owned vehicles is an important part of this effort.

The transition to a low carbon society requires investments in new clean production capital. Some of the abatement investments may have long-lasting effects on emissions and abatement costs, while others may have significant effects on present emissions, but they last for a shorter time period. Examples of long-lasting investments are building or extending a public transport system, carbon capture and storage facilities, and infrastructure for charging stations for electric vehicles. Infrastructure investments may have low or modest impact on immediate emissions so that emissions reductions are initially costly. However, once the investments are made,

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/> (accessed 1.2.2022).

future abatement may become cheaper. For instance, we know from the literature that investments in public charging infrastructure increases the incentives for EV adoption (see, inter alia, [Sierzchula et al., 2014](#); [Wang et al. 2017](#); [Schulz and Rode, 2022](#); [Illmann and Kluge, 2020](#)). Although the need for investments in charging stations in the present may be modest, the investments may be vital for the costs of a decarbonized transport sector in the future. Postponing investments in infrastructure may lead to high demand for infrastructure over a short future time-period. With significant adjustment costs (convex per period investment costs), high investments over a short period of time are more costly than smoothing the investments over a longer time span. Hence, postponing investments may become a costly policy in the end. As argued by [Vogt-Schilb et al. \(2018\)](#), starting with expensive options may make sense when reducing emissions requires investments in long-lived goods, which takes time to deploy. Policy options that work in a similar way is investing in solar panels or battery production that may reduce costs in the future due to learning by doing ([Wigley et al., 1996](#); [Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007](#); [Gillingham and Stock, 2018](#)).

In this paper, we study the optimal combination of short- and long-lived policies for reducing emissions through electrification of the transport sector. Abatement costs are typically specified as functions of the level of abatement, for instance to find the marginal abatement cost curves, see, e.g., [McKittrick \(1999\)](#). One contribution of this paper is to specify abatement costs as functions of abatement from static and dynamic abatement separately. Our definition of static abatement is that they do not affect the costs of future emissions reductions, while dynamic abatement will affect future costs of meeting emissions targets. With our specification, we can compare the marginal abatement costs for the two options and over time.

A third option for meeting abatement obligations is international trade in emissions reductions (permit trade). Permit trading has been implemented in several regions in the world such as EU's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), where companies in the EEA countries<sup>2</sup> decide to what degree they want to reduce their emissions versus buying emissions permits. The EU ETS does not yet cover emissions from the transport sector apart from emissions from aviation operating between EEA countries.<sup>3</sup> However, EU's Effort Sharing Regulation opens for EEA countries to engage in emissions trading in order to comply with the countries' emissions obligations for their non-ETS sectors (which include road transport emissions). There is also some flexibility for the EEA countries to access allowances from the EU ETS.<sup>4,5</sup> In general, for most countries it will not be cost effective to meet the emissions targets by permit purchases only, even in the presence of a well-functioning permit market, as it is cost-effective to implement domestic abatement options with lower marginal cost than the present permit price.

Based on the discussion above, a nation or a large company then faces the following options to meet its climate goals; reduce emissions by short-lived options, buy emissions permits in the international market, and/or make infrastructure investments that also makes it cheaper to meet future emissions targets. These choices are studied in this paper, where we focus on how the choices depend on different (expected) future permit prices.

We first set up a simple model to analyze the implications of the emissions targets and permit market on the profitability of investments in long-lived infrastructure (dynamic abatement) compared to short-term options (static abatement). An abatement cost function is specified as a function of the emissions levels following from the two abatement options respectively. To simplify the presentation, we stick to a two-period analytical model. We show that a higher future permit price likely favors the dynamic abatement option over the static option today.

We next calibrate and simulate a numerical model for Norwegian abatement policies, where we use electrification of the car fleet as an example. Norway is the world leader in supporting the transition from internal combustion engines vehicles (ICEVs) to battery powered electric vehicles (EVs).<sup>6</sup> In 2021, 65 % of the new private cars in Norway were EVs,<sup>7</sup> and this share is expected to increase in the coming years. Still, it takes time until the stock of EVs exceed that of ICEV. The electrification of the car fleet is encouraged by the government through several types of subsidies and privileges (exemption from VAT and excise tax on cars, free parking, free charging, exemption from tolls, right to use the bus lanes). Furthermore, investments in fast charging stations outside the big cities are subsidized. It has been argued that electrification of the transport sector is an expensive way of reducing current GHG emissions ([van Vliet et al. 2011](#); [Bjertnæs, 2013](#); [Holtmark and Skonhoft, 2014](#); [Bye et al., 2021](#)). On the other hand, it takes time to build a charging infrastructure and replace the car fleet, and a large body of literature points to the significance of charging infrastructure for EV adoption ([Sierzchula et al., 2014](#); [Zhang et al., 2016](#); [Mersky et al., 2016](#); [Yu et al., 2016](#); [Li et al., 2017](#); [Figenbaum, 2018](#)). Thus, large investments in EV infrastructure today may pay off in the future if emissions targets become tighter ([Thiel et al., 2010](#)). In our model, we distinguish between the lifetime of the two types of EV support, where investments in infrastructure (distribution grid) for fast charges have a significantly longer lifetime than an EV ([NVE, 2019](#)). Thus, we consider subsidizing EVs to replace ICEVs as the static option, whereas long-lived investment in grids and fast charging stations is considered the dynamic option (see [Section 3.3](#) for more

<sup>2</sup> EEA (European Economic Area) includes EU countries plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

<sup>3</sup> The EU has recently decided to include water transport into the EU ETS, and also agreed to establish a second ETS covering emissions from road transport and buildings.

<sup>4</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/regulation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/regulation_en) (accessed 29.1.2022).

<sup>5</sup> An emissions trading regime can also be designed to allow for various degrees of intertemporal flexibility in abatement. For instance, in EU ETS, banking permits to be used in a future time period is allowed, whereas borrowing from future commitments is not allowed.

<sup>6</sup> We study the standard battery powered electric vehicles (BEVs) in this paper, and do not consider the plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV). There are two reasons for this. First, the government has a target for zero-emission vehicles, and PHEVs are not zero emission vehicles. Second, the impact of charger infrastructure on vehicle purchases likely differ significantly between BEVs and PHEVs, inter alia because BEVs are *only* powered by battery.

<sup>7</sup> <https://ofv.no/bilsalget/bilsalget-i-desember-2021> (accessed 29.1.2022).

details about this).<sup>8</sup>

A related challenge with respect to electrification of road transport is the indirect network effects between EVs and charging stations. Investing in charging stations is only worthwhile if there are many EVs on the road, and buying an EV is more tempting if there are many charging stations around. These indirect network effects have been examined analytically in, e.g., Greaker and Midttømme (2016), Meunier and Ponssard (2020), and Andreassen and Rosendahl (2022), and motivates parts of our applied model specification.

The adoption of EVs is connected to charging stations via two anxieties, see, e.g., Hidrue et al. (2011). We incorporate *charging anxiety*, which is the fear that one will be trapped in queues due to limited charging infrastructure, i.e., long charging time. In a thinly populated country with large distances and cold temperatures in wintertime, *range anxiety*, the fear that battery will be empty between charging stations, affects consumer decisions.<sup>9</sup> Both these anxieties have important implications for the results of our analysis, as the first anxiety increases in the number of EVs whereas both fall in the number of charging stations. While range anxiety has been the main focus in the literature (see, e.g., Rauh et al., 2014; Pevec et al., 2020; IEA, 2022a), our study also stresses the importance of long charging time as a factor for car drivers when they make decisions on buying a car. Greaker et al. (2022) also consider the importance of inconvenient charging time, but the charging time is modelled as a function of battery size and not the number of other vehicles.

The empirical connection between EV purchase, EV subsidies and charging station subsidies has inter alia been studied by Li et al. (2017) on US data, and by Springel (2021) and Schulz and Rode (2022) on Norwegian data. The contribution of the present paper is to explore how the optimal combination of EV subsidies and charging stations will be affected by the target for EVs, which again is affected by the international permit prices and options for permit trading.

Norway as an EEA country is a part of the EU ETS and cooperates with the EU on emissions reductions in the non-ETS sectors, the Effort Sharing Regulation, which also include road transport. According to this regulation, EEA countries can trade emissions allowances with other EEA countries. Such trade possibilities will have implications for policies to reduce domestic emissions. Based on the literature on future potential permit prices for the non-ETS sectors, we discuss under what conditions the present EV policy in Norway can be considered as a cost-effective climate policy, and discuss the optimal combination of EV purchase subsidies, public support of investments in fast charging stations and trade in emissions permits.

The numerical simulations confirm and extend the simple theory model. With international permit trading, the optimal target for EVs increases with the permit prices, thus making both EV subsidies and charging station subsidies more profitable. Furthermore, an increase in the permit price over time, makes it relatively more efficient to subsidize charging stations than to subsidize EVs *today*. Early and time consistent plans for international regulation of GHG emissions will therefore be important for making optimal electrification plans for the transport sector.

## 2. A two-period abatement model

Assume that a country has signed an agreement that puts restrictions on its GHG emissions in period 1 (e.g., 2020–2030) and period 2 (e.g., 2030–2050), implying that emissions must be reduced by a certain amount from a given business as usual (BAU) level. Emissions reductions (abatement) follow from replacing fossil-based consumption by consumption derived from a non-emitting energy sources (e.g., by replacing ICEVs with EVs). The replacement of fossil-based consumption is induced through two types of measures; static policy instrument and dynamic policy instrument. The static policy instrument is direct support to purchase and use of the non-emitting consumption capital (e.g., by subsidizing use and purchase of EVs), whereas the dynamic policy instrument is long-lived investments in infrastructure which reduces the user cost of the non-emitting consumption capital (e.g., by investing in charging infrastructure, pipelines for storing captured carbon, wind mills etc.). Thus, total abatement level at time  $t$ ,  $a_t$ , is the sum of abatement due to the static policy instrument,  $a_{1s}$ , and the dynamic policy instrument,  $a_{1d}$ .

Investments in long lasting infrastructure in period 1 affect the abatement costs also in the second period. Thus, the costs of abatement in period 1 and 2 are given by.

$$C_1 = C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) \quad (1)$$

$$C_2 = C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d}) \quad (2)$$

where the per period cost of abatement is increasing in both types of emissions reductions within each period, but abatement following from investment in infrastructure in period 1 decreases the abatement cost in period 2. By omitting “ $a$ ” in the subscript, these assumptions can be written:

$$C'_{1s} > 0, \quad C'_{1d} > 0, \quad C'_{2s} > 0, \quad C'_{2d} > 0, \quad \text{and} \quad C'_{2d} < 0. \quad (3)$$

<sup>8</sup> In Norway, the average lifetime of an ICEV is 18 years (see <https://www.ssb.no/transport-og-reiseliv/artikler-og-publikasjoner/100-000-el-biler>). However, the lifetime of EVs may be shorter than the lifetime of ICEVs due to the duration of batteries. There are also indications that the second hand price of EVs falls faster than the second hand price of ICEVs due to expectations of shorter lifetime (Andreassen and Lind, 2022).

<sup>9</sup> Batteries will typically perform worse with longer charging times, less capacity and more power leakage in subzero temperatures. This is an obvious concern in large parts of Norway. Battery capacities are continuously improving, however, which may reduce these anxieties in the future. For ICEVs, charging and range anxieties are likely much lower than for EVs, both because of longer driving range for an average ICEV than an average EV, and because the filling time for ICEVs is much shorter than the charging time for EVs.

Abatement costs are assumed to be convex in  $a_{ts}$  and  $a_{td}$ , respectively:

$$C''_{1s,1s} > 0, \quad C''_{1d,1d} > 0, \quad C''_{2s,2s} > 0, \quad C''_{2d,2d} > 0, \quad \text{and} \quad C''_{21d,1d} > 0. \quad (4)$$

In addition, we take into account the limited ability for an economy to switch from low to high level of infrastructure over a short time period, by assuming convex investments cost, see [Vogt-Schilb et al. \(2018\)](#). In our model setup, this means that the cost of reducing emissions through an increased stock of infrastructure in period 2, is lower the higher abatement following from infrastructure in period 1:

$$C''_{2d,1d} < 0 \quad (5)$$

### 2.1. No permit trade

In the absence of permit trading, the country must ensure that the sum of abatement in each period equals the sum of abatement obligations in each period,  $\bar{a}_t$ :

$$a_{ts} + a_{td} = \bar{a}_t \quad t = 1, 2 \quad (6)$$

This leads to the following optimization problem where we have omitted discounting for simplicity:

$$\min TC(a_{1s}, a_{1d}, a_{2s}, a_{2d}) = \min\{C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) + C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d})\} \quad (7)$$

subject to the constraints in (6). We can then form the Lagrangian

$$L = C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) + C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d}) + \lambda_1(\bar{a}_1 - a_{1s} - a_{1d}) + \lambda_2(\bar{a}_2 - a_{2s} - a_{2d}) \quad (8)$$

where  $\lambda_t$  is the shadow cost of the emissions constraint in period  $t$ . This gives the following first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} C'_{1s} &= C'_{1d} + C'_{21d} = \lambda_1 \\ C'_{2s} &= C'_{2d} = \lambda_2 \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

As  $C'_{21d} < 0$ , equation (9) gives the following Proposition:

**Proposition 1.** *If the emissions constraints are binding, cost-effective climate policy implies that the marginal abatement costs of dynamic policies exceed the marginal costs of static policies in period 1.*

This confirms the conclusion in [Vogt-Schilb et al. \(2018\)](#) that it may be optimal to start with an expensive abatement option even if there are cheaper options available.

### 2.2. Permit trade (spatial flexibility)

Next, we consider the case where there is an international market for emissions permits as part of the agreement. We assume that the country is sufficiently small to be a price-taker in this market, where  $P_t$  denotes the permit price in period  $t$ . The country must ensure that abatement in each period plus permit purchase ( $d_t$ ) equal the initial abatement obligation for each period  $\bar{a}_t$ .<sup>10</sup>

$$d_t = \bar{a}_t - a_{ts} - a_{td} \quad t = 1, 2 \quad (10)$$

This leads to the following optimization problem:

$$\min TC(a_{1s}, a_{1d}, a_{2s}, a_{2d}) = \min\{C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) + C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d})\} \quad (11)$$

subject to (10). We can then form the objective function

$$L = C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) + C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d}) + P_1(\bar{a}_1 - a_{1s} - a_{1d}) + P_2(\bar{a}_2 - a_{2s} - a_{2d}). \quad (12)$$

This gives the following first order conditions:<sup>11</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} C'_{1s} &= C'_{1d} + C'_{21d} = P_1 \\ C'_{2s} &= C'_{2d} = P_2 \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

This result echoes [Proposition 1](#).

As the dynamic abatement option lasts over both periods, the permit price in one of the periods has an impact on the optimal abatement policy also in the other period. The impact depends on the sign (and the magnitude) of the cross derivatives  $C''_{t_{ts},td}$ , which

<sup>10</sup> In addition, the country may set restrictions on maximum permit purchase within each period, denoted  $Q_t$ , where  $d_t \leq Q_t$ . If  $Q_t = 0$ , all abatement must be taken at home, while for  $Q_t > 0$ , a certain amount of abatement has to be taken at home. In the simulations below, we only consider cases where there are either no constraints or where all emissions have to be taken at home ( $Q_t = 0$ ).

<sup>11</sup> Note that permit prices will be equal across periods if there are no restrictions on banking and borrowing.

express the increase in marginal cost of one abatement option of an increase in the other abatement option.

**Proposition 2.** For  $C''_{ts,td} = 0$ , an increase in the permit price in one period increases the optimal level of the dynamic abatement option in the other period, but has no impact on the static abatement option in the other period ( $\frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} = \frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} = 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0$ ).

For  $C''_{ts,td} < 0$ , an increase in the permit price in one period increases the optimal level of both types of abatement in the other period ( $\frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0$ ).

For  $C''_{ts,td} > 0$ , an increase in the permit price in one period can increase or decrease the optimal level of abatements in the other period depending on whether the value exceeds the value of the direct second order derivative. The impacts on the two types of abatement will have opposite signs.

**Proof:** See Appendix A.

Proposition 2 states that it is not obvious how a future price increase of carbon affects dynamic abatement today. However, we know that if an increase in one abatement option decreases the marginal cost of the other, a rise in the price of carbon in the next period increases both dynamic and static abatement today. If dynamic abatement does not affect the cost of static abatement, only dynamic abatement will increase if the cost of carbon in the next period increases.

To get a better understanding of the effects, we can make assumptions based on the second order condition. For the necessary second order conditions of (12) to be satisfied, the absolute values of the cross derivatives cannot be too large relative to the second order derivatives; specifically we must have that  $C''_{1s1s}(C''_{1d1d} + C''_{2d1d}) - (C''_{1s1d})^2 > 0$  and  $C''_{2d2d}C''_{2s2s} - C''_{2s2d}^2 > 0$ .<sup>12</sup> This means that we cannot have that the absolute value of the cross derivatives exceed the second order direct derivatives for both abatement options.<sup>13</sup> In the following we assume that both of the direct second order derivatives exceed the absolute value of the cross derivatives in both periods.

**Proposition 3.** Given  $C''_{td,ti} > |C''_{td,ts}|$ ,  $i = d, s$ , we find that:

For  $C''_{ts,td} > 0$ , an increase in the permit price in one period increases the optimal level of the dynamic abatement options and decreases the optimal level of the static abatement option in the other period ( $\frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} < 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} < 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0$ ).

For  $C''_{ts,td} < 0$ , an increase in the permit price in one period gives a larger impact on the dynamic abatement option than on the static abatement option in the other period ( $0 < \frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} < \frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2}$ ,  $0 < \frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} < \frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1}$ ).

**Proof of proposition 3:** See Appendix A.

Hence, we can conclude that if the absolute level of the cross derivatives is not too large relative to the second order derivatives, an increase in the future permit price makes it more profitable to invest in the dynamic abatement option, relative to the static abatement option, today.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. An application of the model - electrification of the car fleet

We now derive how abatement policies to induce electrification of the car fleet can be represented by the model above.

#### 3.1. The market equilibrium

The social cost of electrifying the car fleet consists of four main elements. First, there is a cost difference between cars running on fossil fuels (ICEVs) and EVs. Second, there is a disutility associated with EVs compared to ICEVs related to the need for charging the EV batteries, which brings about both “range anxiety” and “charging anxiety” (Hidrué et al., 2011). The former is due to the limited range for the batteries, and the concern for not reaching the charging station (e.g., on long trips) before the battery is empty. Charging anxiety is related to the concern for long queues in front of the fast chargers. Range anxiety is higher the fewer charging stations in total (and the geographical distribution), whereas charging anxiety is higher the more EVs there are per charging station. Both these types of social costs can be reduced by increased density of fast charger stations (Zhang et al., 2016 and Sierchula et al., 2014). With continued technological progress, battery capacities will likely gradually increase and hence presumably reduce these anxieties over time. However, since our context is a small country, we treat technological progress as exogenous. In sensitivity analysis, we consider the effects of reduced anxieties, e.g., due to increased battery capacities. The third main cost is the investment in new infrastructure.<sup>15</sup>

For simplicity, we present a two-period model (i.e., two future time periods) as in the stylized model above,  $t = 1, 2$ , while  $t =$

<sup>12</sup> Let  $A$  be the Hessian of (12), see Appendix A. In order for necessary conditions for a local minimum to be satisfied, all principal minors must have non-negative determinants.  $C''_{1s1s}(C''_{1d1d} + C''_{2d1d}) - (C''_{1s1d})^2$  is the determinant of the principal minor when the two last rows/columns have been removed.  $C''_{2d2d}C''_{2s2s} - C''_{2s2d}^2$  is the determinant of the principal minor when the two first rows/columns have been removed.

<sup>13</sup> Note that if  $C''_{ts,td} = 0$ , the second order condition is fulfilled.

<sup>14</sup> In the numerical illustration of our model, see Section 3, higher abatement of one type decreases the marginal cost of the other ( $C''_{ts,td} < 0$ ).

<sup>15</sup> The benefit of reduced CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is not included in our analysis as the emissions target is exogenous and the benefits from emissions reduction vis-à-vis BAU will therefore be constant across policies. However, in the scenarios with international permit trading, emissions reductions are valued by the permit price.

0 represents the initial time. Furthermore, we assume a given driving distance per car and a given number of cars,  $\bar{E}_t$ , in each period. Abatement is achieved by an increase in the share of electric cars,  $\mu_t$ , where  $0 \leq \mu_t \leq 1$ . Consumers driving a car can choose between an ICEV or an EV.

The total utility from driving for all consumers driving EVs at a certain time period  $t$  (i.e.,  $\mu_t \bar{E}_t$ ) is specified in the following way, where foot script  $e$  means EV:

$$U_{e,t}(\mu_t, s_t, K_t) = \alpha \mu_t \bar{E}_t - \frac{\beta}{2} (\mu_t \bar{E}_t)^2 - A_1 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{G_t} \right) \mu_t \bar{E}_t - A_2 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{K_t} \right) \mu_t \bar{E}_t - \frac{C}{K_t} \mu_t \bar{E}_t - (q_e - s_t) \mu_t \bar{E}_t \quad (14)$$

The two first terms reflect that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for driving an EV, i.e., the additional utility by adding a new EV driver is falling in the number of EVs ( $\alpha > 0$  and  $\beta > 0$ ).<sup>16</sup> Further, the disutility related to EV charging is represented by the next three terms. For charging anxiety, we distinguish between driving in urban and rural areas.  $A_1 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{G_t} \right)$  represents the charging anxiety per driver in urban areas, while  $A_2 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{K_t} \right)$  is the charging anxiety in rural areas, where  $A_1 > 0$ ,  $A_2 > 0$ . The charging anxiety per EV user is increasing in the number of EVs, but falling in the number of charging stations, where  $G_t$  is the number of charging stations in urban areas, and  $K_t$  is the number of charging stations in rural areas. We distinguish between the two geographic locations assuming that it is privately profitable to build charging stations in urban areas, while not in rural areas without subsidies. Further,  $\frac{C}{K_t} \mu_t \bar{E}_t$  is the range anxiety, which is falling in the number of charging stations in rural areas ( $C > 0$ ). To simplify the analysis, we assume that anxiety is identical across consumers. Thus, we only consider heterogeneity among consumers via the two first terms in (14). Finally,  $q_e$  is the annual cost of driving an EV, which is assumed constant over time, and  $s$  is the annual subsidy to an EV driver.

From (14) we can find that the marginal consumer has the following utility from driving an EV:<sup>17</sup>

$$u_{e,t}(\mu_t \bar{E}_t) = \alpha - \beta \mu_t \bar{E}_t - A_1 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{G_t} \right) - A_2 \left( \frac{\mu_t \bar{E}_t}{K_t} \right) - \frac{C}{K_t} - (q_e - s_t) \quad (15)$$

The amount of capital in rural areas (fast chargers) in period 1 and 2 respectively, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} K_1 &= I_1 + (1 - \delta_0) K_0 \\ K_2 &= I_2 + (1 - \delta_1) K_1 \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

where  $\delta_t$  is the depreciation of capital in each period,  $I_t$  is investment and  $K_0$  is exogenously given by history.<sup>18</sup>

As mentioned above,  $G_t$  is the infrastructure capital that would be available in the absence of public investment, i.e., commercially profitable investments in fast chargers in urban areas. We assume that more EVs increase the profitability of investing in charging stations, and thus lead to more stations in urban areas. In addition, more charging stations reduce the disutility of driving an EV, and therefore increase the incentives to buy an EV (equation (14)). As mentioned in the introduction, this is an example of indirect network effect, which has been studied in the literature when it comes to infrastructure investments, and in particular investments in charging stations.

Following Meunier and Ponssard (2020),<sup>19</sup> we assume that the number of charging stations is proportional to the number of EVs, that is:

$$G_t = B \mu_t \bar{E}_t, \quad B > 0 \quad (17)$$

where  $G$  is increasing in the number of EVs on the road. Note that by inserting this equation in (14), the charging anxiety per EV driver in urban areas becomes constant ( $\frac{A_1}{B}$ ) and the coordination problem from an indirect network effect will also disappear.

In rural areas, investment in charging stations does not respond to more EVs in a similar manner. There are several reasons for this. People in rural areas are much more likely to charge at home. The chargers will therefore mostly supply transient traffic which may not be enough to ensure sufficient availability, which also implies that there are positive network externalities involved in building chargers. Unless the regulator increases the investments in  $K$ , for instance by providing subsidies to commercial investors, more EVs will not lead to more stations in rural areas, only to an increasing charging anxiety for each EV.

The total utility of driving ICEVs at a certain time period  $t$  (i.e.,  $(1 - \mu_t) \bar{E}_t$ ) is specified as follows, where footscript  $f$  means ICEV:

$$U_{f,t}(\mu_t) = (\Pi_f - q_f)(1 - \mu_t) \bar{E}_t \quad (18)$$

Here,  $\Pi_f > 0$  is a fixed utility term, while  $q_f$  is the annual cost of driving an ICEV, which is also assumed to be constant. Thus, the

<sup>16</sup> There may be several reasons why some people are more in favor of an EV than others, such as environmental values, social norms, identity, interest in new technology, practical issues etc., see the literature survey in Kverndokk et al. (2020).

<sup>17</sup> This is derived by differentiating (14) with respect to  $\mu_t \bar{E}_t$ , but taking into account that the parentheses in the third and fourth terms are exogenous to the individual driver.

<sup>18</sup> Note that in the simulations below, the time periods are not equal as we study the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. Thus, the depreciation rates in equation will differ.

<sup>19</sup> See their equation (12).



only heterogeneity among consumers is the preference for driving an EV, i.e., when switching car from an ICEV to an EV.

Each EV driver takes the number of EVs and charging stations as given. By assuming that the utility of the last consumer buying an EV is equal to its utility of driving an ICEV, we find by using (15), (17) and (18):

$$\alpha - \beta\mu_t\bar{E}_t - \frac{A_1}{B} - \frac{A_2}{K_t}\mu_t\bar{E}_t - \frac{C}{K_t} - q_e + s_t = \Pi_f - q_f \quad (19)$$

Thus, in the market equilibrium, it follows that the share of drivers that chooses an EV is (assuming interior solution):

$$\mu_t(s_t, K_t) = \frac{\alpha - \frac{A_1}{B} - \frac{C}{K_t} - (q_e - s_t - q_f) - \Pi_f}{\left(\beta + \frac{A_2}{K_t}\right)\bar{E}_t} \quad (20)$$

The government can influence the decision of the drivers by implementing transport policies. In our model, it has two policy instruments; reducing the user cost of EVs through subsidies  $s_t$  and investing in fast chargers  $K_t$ . Thus, the value of  $\mu_t$  depends on  $s_t$  and  $K_t$ , with the share of EVs increasing in both policy instruments.

Note that  $\lim_{K_t \rightarrow 0} \mu_t(s_t, K_t) = -C/A_2\bar{E}_t$ , which implies that unless  $K_t$  is above a critical value, no individual will choose an EV, i.e.,  $\mu_t(0,0) = 0$ .<sup>20</sup> This critical value is given by:

$$K^{crit}(s) = \frac{C}{(\alpha + s - q_e + q_f - \Pi_f) - A_1/B} \quad (21)$$

Clearly,  $K^{crit}$  can only be non-negative if the denominator is positive which may give a lower bound on  $s$ .

We can decompose the emissions reductions that follow from  $s_t$  and  $K_t$  in the following manner.<sup>21</sup> Let  $\sigma$  be an emissions coefficient, i.e., CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from driving an ICEV in the given time period, while there are no CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from driving an EV. Total abatement in period  $t$  can then be specified as follows:

$$a_t = \sigma[\mu_t(s_t, K_t)\bar{E}_t - \mu(0,0)\bar{E}_t] = \underbrace{\sigma[\mu_t(0, K_t)\bar{E}_t - \mu(0,0)\bar{E}_t]}_{a_{td}=\text{Abatement induced by } K_t} + \underbrace{\sigma[\mu_t(s_t, K_t)\bar{E}_t - \mu_t(0, K_t)\bar{E}_t]}_{a_{ts}=\text{Abatement induced by } s_t} \quad (22)$$

The last line in this equation separates the effect of subsidies and infrastructure investment, where we first single out abatement induced by  $K_t$  and then additional abatement induced by  $s_t$  (given the size of  $K_t$ ). We can write out this line in the following way:

$$\sigma[\mu_t(0, K_t)\bar{E}_t - \mu_t(0,0)\bar{E}_t] = a_{td} \quad (23)$$

$$\sigma[\mu_t(s_t, K_t)\bar{E}_t - \mu_t(0, K_t)\bar{E}_t] = a_{ts} \quad (24)$$

$$a_{td} + a_{ts} = a_t \quad (25)$$

Here  $a_{te}$  is the dynamic abatement created by the infrastructure and  $a_{tf}$  is the additional static abatement from the subsidy, see Section 2 above. Together with the equations of motion in (16), equations (23)-(25) give us 8 equations in 12 variables;  $a_{td}$ ,  $a_{ts}$ ,  $a_t$ ,  $s_t$ ,  $K_t$ ,  $I_t$ , where  $t = 1, 2$ . Thus, to determine the system, we need to set the policy instruments  $K_t$  and  $s_t$ , which we assume are determined optimally by the government. We can solve (23) and (24) with respect to  $K_t$  and  $s_t$ . This yields:

$$K_t(a_{td}) = \frac{C + \frac{a_{td}A_2}{\sigma}}{\alpha - \Pi_f - q_e + q_f - \frac{A_1}{B} - \frac{a_{td}}{\sigma}\beta} \quad (26)$$

$$s(a_{td}, a_{ts}) = \frac{\frac{a_{ts}}{\sigma}(\beta C + A_2((\alpha - q_e + q_f - \Pi_f) - \frac{A_1}{B}))}{C + \frac{a_{td}A_2}{\sigma}} \quad (27)$$

Note that as expected,  $K_t(a_{td})$  is an increasing function in  $a_{td}$ . We also see that  $K_t(a_{td})$  is lower the cheaper it is to drive an EV ( $q_e$ ) or the more expensive it is to drive an ICEV ( $q_f$ ). The reason is that this increases the benefits of driving an EV, and the need for investments as an instrument to increase EVs is therefore lower.

From (25) and  $\mu_t(0,0) = 0$  it follows that the fraction of cars, optimally chosen by the representative consumer, can be expressed as a function of the two types of abatements, i.e., the sum of static and dynamic abatement equals total emission reductions by using EVs:

<sup>20</sup> In our specification, the marginal driver of an EV drives in both urban and rural areas, see (15). We do not distinguish between people living in urban and rural areas. An alternative would be to distinguish between different geographical areas and allow consumers to have more than one car. In that case it could be optimal to have an EV even if the critical value of  $K$  is not reached (equation (21)). However, this would complicate the analysis without affecting the main findings.

<sup>21</sup> Note that we define emissions reductions (and abatement) relative to the situation with no subsidy and no charging station (in which case there are no EVs), and not relative to a scenario without emissions constraint. In the numerical simulations, the number of charging stations and EVs are both strictly positive even in the case without emissions constraints.

$$\hat{\mu}_t(a_{td}, a_{ts}) = \mu_t(s_t(a_{td}, a_{ts}), K_t(a_{td})) = \frac{a_{td} + a_{ts}}{\sigma E} \quad (28)$$

We can now define the utility of the EV owners as functions of abatement efforts:

$$V_{e,t}(a_{td}, a_{ts}) = U_{e,t}(\mu_t(s_t(a_{td}, a_{ts}), K_t(a_{td})), s_t(a_{td}, a_{ts}), K_t(a_{td})) \quad (29)$$

### 3.2. The Government's decision problem

The governmental decision problem is to decide the values of  $a_{td}$  and  $a_{ts}$  that minimize social cost, taken into account the abatement targets and permit trade options. We define the consumer's cost as the loss in welfare (eq. (14) and (18)) of the transport policy. As derived above, the fraction of EVs can be expressed as a function of the two types of abatement, and therefore, the welfare of the representative consumer is a function of  $a_{td}$  and  $a_{ts}$ . In addition, the government must also consider the cost of investing in  $K_t$ . If we denote the cost of  $I_t$  by  $\kappa_t(I_t)$ , we can write the social cost of abatement in each period by:<sup>22</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) &= -V_{e,1}(a_{1d}, a_{1s}) - (\Pi_f - q_f)(1 - \hat{\mu}_1(a_{1d}, a_{1s}))\bar{E}_1 \\ &\quad + s(a_{1d}, a_{1s})\hat{\mu}_1(a_{1d}, a_{1s})\bar{E}_1 + \kappa(I_1(a_{1d})) \\ C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d}) &= -V_{e,2}(a_{2d}, a_{2s}) - (\Pi_f - q_f)(1 - \hat{\mu}_2(a_{2d}, a_{2s}))\bar{E}_2 \\ &\quad + s(a_{2d}, a_{2s})\hat{\mu}_2(a_{2d}, a_{2s})\bar{E}_2 + \kappa(I_2(a_{1d}, a_{2d})) \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

Note that we have added the payments of  $s_t$  from the government to EV drivers into the cost functions in (30). The subsidy should not be included in the social cost as it is only an internal domestic transfer. However, since  $s_t$  is included in the utility of the EV owners ( $V_{e,t}(a_{td}, a_{ts})$ ), it must be counterbalanced by government payments.

For simplicity, we have omitted the social cost of public funds. The government's intertemporal cost function may then be written as

$$TC = \theta_1 C_1(a_{1s}, a_{1d}) + \theta_2 C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d}) \quad (31)$$

where  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  are discount factors for period 1 and 2, respectively, which is necessitated by our simulations bundling several years into one period. As assumed in Section 2, eq (5), the cost of reducing emissions through increased stock of infrastructure in period 2 is lower the higher abatement following from infrastructure in period 1. This can be seen by differentiating  $C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d})$  in (30) with respect to  $a_{1d}$  and  $a_{2d}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} C''_{2a_{2d}, a_{1d}} &= \frac{\partial^2 \kappa(I_2(a_{1d}, a_{2d}))}{\partial a_{2d} \partial a_{1d}} \\ &= \frac{\partial^2}{\partial a_{2d} \partial a_{1d}} \kappa(K(a_{2d}) - (1 - \delta_2)K(a_{1d})) \\ &= -(1 - \delta)K'(a_{2d})K'(a_{1d})\kappa''(I_2) < 0 \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

The first equality in (32) follows from  $\kappa(I_2(a_{1d}, a_{2d}))$  being the only term in  $C_2(a_{2s}, a_{2d}, a_{1d})$  that contains both  $a_{1e}$  and  $a_{2e}$  and is therefore the only term with non-zero cross derivative. As discussed in Section 2, the conditions for optimal abatement policies depends on the international permit trade options. The first order conditions can be expressed in the same way as in (9) and (13).

An increase in the number of fast chargers,  $K_t$ , reduces both charging and range anxiety, and thus increases the consumers' utility of shifting from ICEV to EV, which again decreases the level of the subsidy to induce more EVs. This means that  $C''_{ts,td} < 0$  in our model specification.

### 3.3. Calibration of the model

The model is calibrated to data for Norway with 2020 as the base year. We further consider the periods 2020–2030 and 2030–2050, but assume that all variables are identical each year within in each period, except for the investments in charging station, which occur in the first year within each period. For ease of reference, all parameters are summarized in Appendix C.

The total number of private cars in 2018 was according to Statistics Norway about 2,750,000,<sup>23</sup> and the share of electric vehicles in 2020 was equal to 12%.<sup>24</sup> Predictions for the number of private cars and private transport for the next decades vary (see, e.g., Madslien et al., 2014; KPMG, 2018), but based on these and the current trends, such as car sharing and self-driving cars, it may be reasonable to assume that the total number of private cars will not increase significantly. We have therefore set the total number to 2,900,000 across both periods.

The capital stock in the model is defined as the number of fast charges or supercharges for electric vehicles. 94% of the owners of electric vehicles in Norway charge their cars at home (Figenbaum, 2018). However, fast chargers are important for long distance

<sup>22</sup> Note also that the investment cost functions can be written as functions of abatement in the following way,  $I_1(a_{1d}) = K(a_{1d}) - (1 - \delta_1)K_0$  and  $I_2(a_{1d}, a_{2d}) = K(a_{2d}) - (1 - \delta_2)K(a_{1d})$ .

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/11823/>.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.ssb.no/transport-og-reiseliv/artikler-og-publikasjoner/over-halvparten-av-nye-personbiler-er-elbiler>.



driving, and the investments in chargers the last few years have mainly been fast chargers in the traffic corridors between cities. In addition, fast chargers in cities may be important for those living in flats without access to home charging. Figenbaum (2018) points to investments in fast chargers as a main instrument to reduce distance anxiety. According to Elbilforeningen<sup>25</sup>, there were 3,288 fast- and superchargers in Norway in 2020. The Government subsidizes fast chargers outside the main cities through the governmental body ENOVA. The subsidy is 40% of the cost. We set the number of fast- and superchargers in Norway in the year 2020 to 3,300, where 2,200, is the number of commercial fast chargers ( $G$ ) not receiving subsidies, while the rest, 1,100 ( $K$ ), have received governmental subsidies. The parameter  $B$  in the equation for  $G$ , i.e., (17), is calibrated based on 2020-values.

Fast chargers consist of several components with different lifetimes. The lifetime of the charger itself is about 10–15 years (Schroeder and Traber, 2012). However, the cost of the charger is only about 25% of the total costs.<sup>26</sup> Physical facilitation is required such as casting and burial of cables, in addition to power connection. These components have longer lifetimes. For road projects as well as power connections, the lifetime is set to 40 years (Statens vegvesen, 2018; NVE, 2019). We therefore choose a lifetime of fast chargers of 40 years, using linear depreciation. We have not set an explicit lifetime of EVs, but we assume that it is possible to set the share of EVs optimal in each period. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as a lifetime of EVs equal to 10 years.<sup>27</sup>

The costs of fast chargers vary. Schroeder and Traber (2012) report numbers for Germany. For all chargers, the numbers vary between €1000 and €125,000, where the highest number is for public superchargers. Figenbaum (2018, also personal communication) reports prices for fast chargers from NOK 400,000 (€ 40,000) and higher, and that the fast chargers that have received governmental support cost between NOK 500,000 and 700,000 (€50,000 and €70,000). Based on this, we set the price of fast chargers to €60,000 and the subsidy to €24,000 (40%).<sup>28</sup> In the model, the investment cost is assumed quadratic, i.e.,  $\eta(I) = \eta I^2$ , where  $\eta$  is calibrated based on values in 2020.

The costs of driving a car are taken from Smarte Penger (2019). Based on a set of assumptions,<sup>29</sup> the annual cost of an EV and an ICEV vehicle is set to €8,600 and € 10,900 respectively. These numbers include taxes and subsidies. The subsidy rate is taken from Kverndokk et al. (2020), who calculate the subsidy to electric vehicles to be 20%, where the main part is exemptions from VAT.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the cost of driving an electric vehicle without subsidies is set to €10,300. Further, the tax rate on ICEVs is set to 40% based on Kverndokk et al. (2020).

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per year from ICEVs is set to 2.2 ton, and held constant in the analysis. This calculation is based on a driving distance of 16,000 km per year, and emissions of 140 g CO<sub>2</sub> per kilometer. This is a little bit lower than the numbers calculated for 2016 from Statistics Norway, which is 153 g per kilometer.<sup>31</sup> However, the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from driving an average car have fallen over the last few years.

Further, we set the discount rate to 4% annually.<sup>32</sup>

It is hard to find estimates from the literature to calibrate the rest of the parameters ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$ ,  $C$ ,  $\Pi_f$ ), and we need to make some assumptions. We assume that the marginal charging anxiety is the same in rural and urban areas, and that the total (urban plus rural) marginal charging anxiety is the same as the marginal range anxiety. As the total number of vehicles is exogenous, we can scale the model so that  $\Pi_f = q_f$ . We further assume that in absence of range and charging anxiety, 90% of the population would choose an EV instead of driving an ICEV. Thus, there would still be preferences for ICEVs in this case even if the costs of driving are cheaper for EVs, due to heterogeneity of preferences for cars beyond costs. Finally, we assume that the present (base year) subsidy is too low to compensate for range and charging anxiety. For simplicity, we assume that the subsidy should be doubled to outweigh these anxieties. However, as several of these assumptions are a bit ad hoc, we do sensitivity analyses.

The model is a two-period model, and investments made for the period 2031–2050 will have lower value than investments made for the period 2020–2030, since the benefits of the investments after 2050 do not count. Thus, to adjust for this, we have included a factor that scale down the investment costs based on the remaining lifetime of the investments from 2051 onwards. The longer the remaining lifetime, the lower is this factor. Appendix B gives the calculations of these factors at the different times of investment.

### 3.4. Permit market assumptions

We will explore how the possibilities for emissions trade across countries affect the optimal distribution of the two types of abatement policies. For this task, we will need estimates of the future prices of tradable emissions. EU aims to cut emissions by 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990) and to be carbon neutral by 2050.<sup>33</sup> However, at present (February 2022), EU has not specified the new

<sup>25</sup> <https://elbil.no/om-elbil/elbilstatistikk/ladestasjoner/>.

<sup>26</sup> Erik Figenbaum, personal communication.

<sup>27</sup> According to Andreassen and Lind (2022), prices of used EVs in Norway fell by on average 17% per year in the period 2011–2021, suggesting that the value of an EV is reduced by about 85% after 10 years.

<sup>28</sup> The Governmental body ENOVA subsidizes fast charges in rural areas by 40%.

<sup>29</sup> E.g., the retail price is NOK 400,000 (€40,000), annual driving distance is 16,000 km, and the car is sold after three years.

<sup>30</sup> There are some minor variations in subsidies to EVs across the country for instance due to free ferries and free parking which are included in our subsidy estimate. However, in our estimate the major part of the subsidy is exemption from VAT.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.ssb.no/transport-og-reiseliv/artikler-og-publikasjoner/mindre-utslipp-per-kjorte-kilometer>.

<sup>32</sup> The recommendation in the Ministry of Finance (2012) for public projects with normal risk and a horizon of <40 years is to use a discount rate equal to 4 per cent. They assume a risk-free interest rate of 2.5 per cent and a risk adjustment of 1.5 per cent.

<sup>33</sup> [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/european-green-deal/2030-climate-target-plan\\_en#:~:text=With%20the%202030%20Climate%20Target%20Plan%2C%20the%20Commission,from%20the%20previous%20target%20of%20at%20least%2040%25](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/european-green-deal/2030-climate-target-plan_en#:~:text=With%20the%202030%20Climate%20Target%20Plan%2C%20the%20Commission,from%20the%20previous%20target%20of%20at%20least%2040%25) (accessed 18.10.2022).

emissions target for sectors not covered by the EU-ETS (non-ETS); the Effort Sharing Regulation. In addition to EU Member States, Iceland and Norway have agreed to implement the Effort Sharing Regulation, which translates this commitment into binding annual GHG emission. Norway's present target is to reduce non-ETS emissions by 45% in 2030 compared to 2005, but the new EU target will likely mean that Norway has to reduce non-ETS emissions with more than 50%. Non-ETS includes land and sea transport as well as agriculture, buildings and waste. However, we restrict the analyses to emissions from passenger cars in our numerical analysis, and assume that these emissions will have to drop in line with total non-ETS emissions in Norway. As Norwegian emissions from passenger cars fell by 18% from 2005 to 2019,<sup>34</sup> and by assuming a new target of 55% in 2030, emissions then have to fall by 45% from 2020 to 2030. For simplicity, we set this target to 50%. Further, in 2050, we assume that the whole car fleet has to be electric. As we do simulations over periods of ten years (2020–2030) and 20 years (2030–2050), we set the targets equal to the average between the start year and the final year in the period. Thus, annual targets are implemented as 25% reduction from 2020 to 2030, and 75% reduction from 2030 to 2050.<sup>35</sup>

The Effort Sharing Regulation allows Member States to buy and sell allowances from and to other Member States.<sup>36</sup> In the following, we refer to this potential trade in allowances across countries as the non-ETS permit market. Although permit trade is an option, there is yet no permit market, and it remains to be seen whether a permit market will emerge. Also, the Norwegian Government has signaled a reduction goal for GHG emissions within Norway.<sup>37</sup>

The literature investigating the potential price path for non-ETS permits is scarce, and obviously, price estimates will be highly uncertain. The permit market price, if a permit market emerge, will not only depend on the abatement costs in the non-ETS sectors, but also on the use of the flexible mechanisms of the Effort Sharing Regulation, and the use of other policy instruments and legislations for achieving other energy and environmental targets (e.g., renewable shares and energy efficiency), see Aune and Golombek (2021) and EC (2018).

Bye et al. (2019) construct marginal abatement costs under EU's Effort Sharing Regulation based on a multi sector CGE model. For estimating the permit market price in 2030, they have as a starting point two reference scenarios for projected 2030 emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> in EU (with current policies), EEA (2017) and EC (2016), and they consider various options for flexibility mechanism and abatement also for non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG. They pick out two key scenarios, one which leads to a 2030 permit price of 64 Euro per ton CO<sub>2</sub>, and another (the highest cost scenario) which gives a permit price of 158 Euro per ton CO<sub>2</sub>. The permit price in the low-cost scenario of Bye et al. (2019) is in line with the permit price of 70 Euro in the uniform tax scenario in Vielle (2020) and the prices of Euro 60 and Euro 91 based on macro-economic modelling of cost efficient abatement in Capros et al. (2014).<sup>38</sup> We will use the price scenarios from Bye et al. (2019) for 2030 in our numerical model.

Bye et al. (2019) do not present any figures for 2050, but they report that the marginal abatement cost curve is convex. For 2050 with carbon neutrality in Europe, we choose to operate with marginal abatement costs (permit prices) 2.5 times as high as the 2030 prices in our numerical illustration. This is in line with Capros et al. (2014). Thus, in the low permit price scenario, the permit price in 2030 is €64 and €160 in 2050. In the high permit price scenario, the permit price is €158 in 2030 and €395 in 2050.

#### 4. Numerical results – The case of Norway

We now turn to scenarios for electrification of passenger cars in Norway, given the emissions targets as explained in the previous section. We denote the first period (2020–2030) 2030 and the second period (2030–2050) 2050. To capture the uncertainty about flexibility in non-ETS across countries, we consider three scenarios (S1–S3), where the sum of emissions targets over both periods are identical across the scenarios. These scenarios are compared to a benchmark scenario without emissions caps (S0):

S0. No emissions caps.

S1. Emissions targets in each period without permit trade. The targets correspond to EV shares of respectively 37% and 79% in 2030 and 2050 (cf. footnote 35).

S2. Emissions targets in each period and permit trade (spatial flexibility). Permit price set to €64 in 2030 and €160 in 2050.

S3. Same as scenario S2 (spatial flexibility), but with higher permit prices. Permit price set to €158 in 2030 and €395 in 2050.

##### 4.1. Simulation results

The results are summarized in Table 1. From the table we see that a general result is that the subsidy should be lower and the investments in charging stations should be higher than in the initial situation in all scenarios. More EVs increase charging anxiety,

<sup>34</sup> <https://miljostatus.miljodirektoratet.no/tema/klima/norske-utslipp-av-klimagasser/klimagassutslipp-fra-veitrafikk/> (accessed 18.10.2022).

<sup>35</sup> The emissions in 2020 are equal to  $\sigma(1 - \mu_0)\bar{E}$ , while emissions in 2030 should be  $0.75 \cdot \sigma(1 - \mu_0)\bar{E}$ . Setting  $0.75 \cdot \sigma(1 - \mu_0)\bar{E} = \sigma(1 - \mu_{2030})\bar{E}$ , i. e.,  $0.75 \cdot (1 - \mu_0) = (1 - \mu_{2030})$ , we calculate that  $\mu$  over the period 2020–2030 should be 0.37. In a similar way,  $\mu$  over the period 2030–2050 should be 0.79.

<sup>36</sup> The Effort Sharing Regulation also allows for some flexibility in terms of banking and borrowing across time periods, and limited flexibility in terms of access to credits from the land use sectors and EU-ETS allowances. This will not be considered here.

<sup>37</sup> <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/hurdalsplattformen/id2877252/> (accessed 28.09.2022).

<sup>38</sup> Bye et al. (2019) use 2011-prices, whereas Vielle (2020) and Capros et al. (2014) use 2017-prices and 2005-prices, respectively.

**Table 1**  
Outcomes of different scenarios.

Scenario	Period	Share of EVs ( $\mu$ )	Number of stations (1000 $K$ )	EV subsidy (€/year)	$a_{td}$ million tons/year	$a_{ts}$ million tons/year	$\frac{a_{td}}{a_{td} + a_{ts}}$
<i>Initially</i>	2020	12%	1.10	1700	NA	NA	NA
S0	2030	34 %	10.5	0.00	2.20	0.00	1.00
	2050	40 %	14.2	0.00	2.54	0.00	1.00
S1	2030	38 %	12.9	0.00	2.44	0.00	1.00
	2050	78 %	21.6	591	2.96	2.02	0.59
S2	2030	37 %	12.2	0.00	2.38	0.00	1.00
	2050	49 %	17.4	111	2.75	0.36	0.88
S3	2030	45 %	14.7	86	2.58	0.27	0.91
	2050	78 %	22.2	574	2.98	1.97	0.60

while more charging stations reduce anxiety *ceteris paribus*. This might indicate that charging and range anxiety have not been taken fully into account in the present governmental decision-making.

In the scenario with no emissions caps (S0), no new abatement policies are implemented, but there are still significantly higher shares of electric cars in the two periods (34% and 40%, respectively) than in 2020 (12%). The optimal number of subsidized charging stations ( $K$ ) increases almost tenfold in 2030 as compared to 2020 (see the Table 1). These results should be interpreted with caution, however, as they follow to a large degree from the calibration, and the implicit assumption that the current level of stations and EVs are far too low. In absence of emissions targets, the optimal subsidy is negative as more EVs mean more charging anxiety (negative externality), but we only consider non-negative subsidies in our analysis.<sup>39</sup> Building more charging stations, on the other hand, reduces both charging and range anxiety.

Next, we consider the different policy scenarios, i.e., scenarios S1–S3, with the same emissions cap but with different assumptions about permit trade and permit price. In scenario S1, where the emissions cap must be met without any access to permit trade, the share of EVs increases moderately in period 1 and substantially in period 2 compared to S0. This follows from the much stronger emissions cap in the last period. Note that the emissions constraint in period 1 is in fact not binding – the share of EVs is 40% and thus exceeds the target of 37%. The reason is that it is optimal to invest in many charging stations already in period 1, which increases the demand for EVs even without any subsidy (note that the subsidy in period 1 is zero). The number of subsidized charging stations increases by around 25% in period 1 and around 50% in period 2 (compared to scenario S0). The large number of stations makes it more tempting for car owners to buy an EV as the charging and range anxieties diminish substantially. In the second period it is optimal to implement a subsidy to EV owners (but only one third of the initial subsidy).

Next, we consider international permit trading (comparing S2 and S3 with S1). The impacts obviously depend highly on the assumed permit price. With the low price (scenario S2), there are only small changes in Period 1 (some sales of permits), while in Period 2 it is optimal to buy a huge number of permits, relaxing the domestic emissions constraint and reducing the number of EVs from 78% to 49%. The EV subsidy and the number of stations also drop accordingly.

If permit prices are about 150% higher (scenario S3), it is optimal to sell much more permits in Period 1, while still buy in Period 2, although significantly less than in S2. Compared with S2, it is optimal to increase the share of EVs in both periods. A positive EV subsidy is now required in both periods, and it is substantially larger in Period 2, compared with S2. Hence, we see that the emissions price has a significant impact on the electrification of the car fleet.


Table 1 also shows the levels of  $a_{td}$  and  $a_{ts}$ , i.e., the levels of abatement through respectively investing in charging stations (dynamic abatement policy) and EV subsidies (static abatement policy). We see that variations in  $a_{td}$  and  $a_{ts}$  correspond to variations in number of stations ( $K$ ) and EV subsidy. We use these results to test the propositions in Section 2.

Proposition 1 states that if the emissions constraint for period 2 is binding, cost-effective climate policy implies that the marginal abatement cost of dynamic policies exceeds the marginal cost of static policies in period 1. This is the case independent of spatial flexibility in reaching the emissions target. We test this proposition for scenario S3. Note that we cannot test this in the scenarios where  $a_{ts} = 0$  as we do not have interior solutions in these cases (i.e., scenarios S1 and S2). We find that the marginal costs of  $a_{td}$  in S3 are 8.2 times higher than the marginal costs of  $a_{ts}$ , thus confirming Proposition 1.


Proposition 2 states that an increase in the permit price in one period makes it profitable to increase both static and dynamic abatement in the other period if the cross derivative ( $C''_{ts,td} < 0$ ) is negative, which is the case in our numerical model. Further, Proposition 3 states that under certain conditions, dynamic abatement increases more than static abatement (when the permit price increases in another period). Fig. 1 illustrates this for scenario S3 in the case with an increase of the permit price in Period 1 (with the Period 2 permit price being fixed at 395 Euro/ton). The figure shows the permit price in Period 1 along the horizontal axis, and the optimal abatement and permit demand as a function of this price.

We see from Fig. 1 that permit sales in the first period increase as expected (permit demand becomes more negative). Furthermore, both static ( $a_{ts}$ ) and dynamic ( $a_{td}$ ) abatement in Period 1 increase with the permit price. The sum of additional abatement equals the additional permit sales. As seen from the figure, static abatement increases much more than dynamic abatement in the first period. This

<sup>39</sup> If we allow for negative subsidies, the optimal subsidies in periods 1 and 2 are –214 and –193, respectively, and the shares of EVs drop to respectively 24% and 30%. The number of charging stations still increases considerably by 207% and 312%.



**Fig. 1.** Effects of an increase in the permit price in Period 1 on the two abatement options and net permit demand under scenario S3 (with Period 2 permit price being fixed at 395 Euro/ton).



**Fig. 2.** Effects of an increase in the permit price in Period 2 on the two abatement options and net permit demand under scenario S3 (with Period 1 permit price fixed at 158 Euro per ton).

is because of the diminishing returns to stations, as explained above. We also notice that both static ( $a_{2s}$ ) and dynamic ( $a_{2d}$ ) abatement in Period 2 also increase, although only slightly, with higher permit price in Period 1, thus confirming [Proposition 2](#). The reason is that the additional charging stations built in Period 1 are also to some degree in operation in Period 2, which makes it less costly to comply with the emissions target in the second period. Although hardly visible in the figure, dynamic abatement in Period 2 increases slightly more than static abatement, confirming [Proposition 3](#). As a consequence of somewhat more abatement in Period 2, permit demand in this period declines as the permit price in Period 1 increases.

We now turn to the effects of an increase of the permit price in Period 2, see [Fig. 2](#).

Not surprisingly, permit demand in Period 2 drops substantially as the permit price in that period increases, whereas both static

**Table 2**  
Sensitivity results for scenario 3.

	$a_{1d}$ Mtons/year	$a_{1s}$ Mtons/year	$\frac{a_{1d}}{a_{1d} + a_{1s}}$	$a_{2d}$ Mtons/year	$a_{2s}$ Mtons/year	$\frac{a_{2d}}{a_{2d} + a_{2s}}$
<i>Benchmark<sup>a</sup></i>	2.58	0.27	0.91	2.98	1.97	0.60
Faster depreciation of stations (20 years)	2.49	0.23	0.92	2.88	1.85	0.61
50% lower investment costs ( $\kappa = 12$ ) for stations in Period 2	2.50	0.23	0.91	3.14	2.18	0.59
30% more cars in Period 2	2.77	0.14	0.95	3.22	2.66	0.55
25% lower user costs of EVs in Period 2	2.13	0.11	0.95	1.20	5.18	0.19
Total charging anxiety = 2 · Total range anxiety	1.72	0.22	0.89	2.10	1.68	0.56
Total range anxiety = 2 · Total charging anxiety	4.09	0.43	0.90	4.47	1.91	0.70
Total anxiety = 1.5 · Total EV subsidy	1.18	1.34	0.47	1.98	4.40	0.31
Total anxiety = 4 · Total EV subsidy	3.59	0.00	1.00	3.76	0.44	0.90
50% of car owners buy EV when no anxiety	1.77	0.22	0.89	1.97	1.15	0.63
100% of car owners buy EV when no anxiety	3.08	0.27	0.92	3.55	2.17	0.62

<sup>a</sup> In the benchmark model, depreciation of stations is 40 years, total charging anxiety is assumed to equal total range anxiety, total anxiety is assumed to equal twice the total EV subsidies, and 90% of car owners would buy EV if there were no anxiety. See [Section 3.3](#) for details.

( $a_{2s}$ ) and dynamic ( $a_{2d}$ ) abatement in Period 2 increase to comply with the emissions target in that period. Again we see that static abatement increases much more than dynamic abatement. This is partly because of the diminishing returns to stations, but also because more stations are being built in Period 1 and these are only partially depreciated in the following period. That is, even though the permit price in Period 1 is unchanged (and there is no intertemporal flexibility), it is optimal to build more stations in Period 1 as the future permit price increases (increasing  $a_{1d}$  in [Fig. 2](#)). The explanation is the convex investment costs of building stations, which makes it cost-effective to smooth investments over time.<sup>40</sup> More charging stations in Period 1 further increases the optimal level of EVs in the first period, thus increasing both static ( $a_{1s}$ ) and dynamic ( $a_{1d}$ ) abatement, again in accordance with [Proposition 2](#). The increase in static abatement is much smaller than the increase in dynamic abatement in period 1 though, consistent with [Proposition 3](#). With more abatement in Period 1, permit sales in this period are accordingly increased when the permit price in Period 2 increases. To conclude, the numerical results confirm our results from the analytical model in [Section 2](#); the larger the increase in the permit price in the second period, the more profitable to invest in long lasting infrastructure today, relative to short-lived policies.

#### 4.2. Sensitivity analyses

As indicated in [Section 3](#), the parameters of the model are uncertain, and we had to make several assumptions in the calibration of the model. Thus, we have performed a number of sensitivity analyses, focusing on the most uncertain and important parameters. In reporting the results of these analysis, we mainly focus on the size of respectively static ( $a_{1s}$ ) and dynamic ( $a_{1d}$ ) abatement in the two periods in scenario 3. The results are shown in [Table 2](#).

We see from the table that the results are quite robust to changes in most of the exogenous variables. However, the results are sensitive to two main changes, that is, the user costs of EVs in period 2, and the total anxiety. If the user costs of EVs in period 2 fall by 25%, more abatement should be done by the static alternative than the dynamic alternative in period 2. We know from equation (26) that a lower user costs for EV reduces the optimal number of chargers, and therefore, dynamic abatement, and from equation (27) that lower dynamic abatement increases the subsidy rate. Thus, static abatement will increase.

Further, if the total anxiety is reduced (e.g., due to increased battery capacity), we find that more abatement should be taken by the static alternative than the dynamic alternative in both periods. The reason is that we do not have to make so large investments to reduce anxiety, and the negative impact of subsidies for anxiety is smaller.

#### 5. Conclusions

Policy makers and owners of large companies face many options to reduce GHG emissions. Some of these options are static in the way that they do not affect the costs of future emissions reductions. Examples of this is buying permits in the international permit market or reducing consumption of fossil fuel based goods. Other options are dynamic in the sense that they will affect future costs of meeting emissions targets. Such options may be infrastructure investments that for instance makes it possible to use other fuel types or reduce emissions intensive consumption activities.

This paper studies the choice of policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions with or without access to permit trading. Independent of such flexibility, we find that cost-effective climate policy implies that the marginal abatement cost of the dynamic alternative may

<sup>40</sup> Due to partial depreciation and discounting it is optimal to build a majority of stations in the second period when there are more EVs (because of the stricter emissions target), see the figure.

exceed the costs of static abatement, such as the permit price. Thus, expensive abatement investments today are justified if the benefits last over several time periods.

The framework is used for a numerical study on electrification of the cars in Norway, where infrastructure investments such as building charging stations across the country, makes it expensive to reduce emissions in the transport sector from electrification today, but will reduce costs in later periods.

Our numerical simulations show that it can be cost-effective to invest in charging stations today at a marginal abatement cost of eight times higher than the marginal abatement cost of subsidizing EVs. Thus, starting with the most expensive abatement option may make sense if it has impacts on abatement costs in years to come. The results further point to subsidizing charging stations as the dominate policy in the scenarios studied, even in a country as Norway with a large market share of EVs. The reason is that this is the most cost-efficient way to reach zero-emission targets in the transportation sector as it reduces both charging- and range anxiety, while subsidizing purchase of EVs increase charging anxiety, and will have no impact on range anxiety. This is also in line with IEA (2022a, b). For instance, IEA (2022b, p. 49) concludes that “Current momentum in EV sales can only be sustained if ever larger shares of the population have access to convenient and affordable charging infrastructure, both publicly available and private chargers at residences and workplaces, among other destinations. Governments will have to continue facilitating investment and minimising barriers to the roll-out of charging infrastructure.”

We also find that the development of the international permit market influences the domestic transition from petrol-based fuel to electricity in the transport sector. Higher future permit price makes it relatively more efficient to invest in the dynamic abatement relative to the static option today, although the impact is quite small. Within the same period, we find that static abatement increases much more than the dynamic abatement when the permit price increases. The reason is diminishing return from new stations, that is, the marginal benefits of more stations drop quite significantly as the number of stations increases. Diminishing return from new stations in Norway is also confirmed by Springel (2021).

The results show that the options available to reach long-term emissions target have a large impact on the optimal policy choices of the Government. Large infrastructure investments may be more profitable under some regimes than other. This stresses the importance of early and time consistent plans for regulations of international GHG emissions.

## Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

## Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3

By total differentiating (13), we find:

$A^*da = dP$ , where.

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} C''_{1s,1s} & C''_{1s,1d} & 0 & 0 \\ C''_{1s,1d} & C''_{1d,1d} + C''_{2d,1d} & 0 & C''_{2d,2d} \\ 0 & 0 & C''_{2s,2s} & C''_{2s,2d} \\ 0 & C''_{2d,2d} & C''_{2s,2d} & C''_{2d,2d} \end{pmatrix}, da = \begin{pmatrix} da_{1s} \\ da_{1d} \\ da_{2s} \\ da_{2d} \end{pmatrix}, dP = \begin{pmatrix} dP_1 \\ dP_1 \\ dP_2 \\ dP_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Solving the system of equations gives:

$$\begin{aligned} da_{1s} &= \frac{(C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{2d,1d} - C''_{1d,1d})(C''_{2s,2d} - C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2s}) - C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2s}}{|A|}dP_1, \\ &\quad + \frac{C''_{1s,1d}C''_{2d,2d}(C''_{2s,2s} - C''_{2s,2d})}{|A|}dP_2, \\ da_{1d} &= \frac{(C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s})(C''_{2s,2d} - C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2s})}{|A|}dP_1 - \frac{C''_{1s,1s}C''_{2d,2d}(C''_{2s,2s} - C''_{2s,2d})}{|A|}dP_2, \\ da_{2s} &= \frac{(C''_{1s,1s} - C''_{1s,1d})C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2d}}{|A|}dP_1 \\ &\quad - \frac{(C''_{2d,2d} - C''_{2s,2d})C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s}(C''_{2d,2d} + (C''_{1d,1d} + C''_{2d,1d})(C''_{2s,2d} - C''_{2d,2d}))}{|A|}dP_2, \\ da_{2d} &= \frac{(C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s})C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2s}}{|A|}dP_1 - \frac{(C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s}(C''_{1d,1d} + C''_{2d,1d}))(C''_{2s,2s} - C''_{2s,2d})}{|A|}dP_2, \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

where  $|A| = \text{Det}(A) = [C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s}(C''_{1d,1d} + C''_{2d,1d})](C''_{2s,2d} - C''_{2d,2d}C''_{2s,2s}) - C''_{1s,1s}C''_{2s,2s}C''_{2d,2d}$ . It follows from the assumptions



about the second order conditions for the optimization problem that  $|A| > 0$ .

As stated in footnote 12, the terms  $(C''_{1s,1d} - C''_{1s,1s}(C''_{1d,1d} + C''_{2d,2d}))$  and  $(C''_{2s,2d} - C''_{2s,2s}C''_{2d,2d})$  must both be negative for the necessary conditions for a local minimum to be satisfied. We see from (33) and (4) that  $\frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} = 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} = 0$ ,  $\frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0$  for  $C''_{ts,td} = 0$ ,

$$\text{and } \frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} > 0, \quad \frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0, \quad \frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} > 0, \quad \frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0 \text{ for } C''_{ts,td} < 0,$$

For  $C''_{ts,td} > 0$ ;

$$\frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} > 0 \text{ for } C''_{2d,2d} > C''_{2d,2s}, \quad \frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2} < 0 \text{ for } C''_{2d,2d} < C''_{2d,2s},$$

$$\frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} > 0 \text{ for } C''_{1d,1d} > C''_{1d,1s}, \quad \frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1} < 0 \text{ for } C''_{1d,1d} < C''_{1d,1s}.$$

For  $C''_{ts,td} < 0$ , and given  $C''_{td,td} > |C''_{td,ts}|$ , we find:

$$0 < \frac{da_{1s}}{dP_2} < \frac{da_{1d}}{dP_2}, \quad 0 < \frac{da_{2s}}{dP_1} < \frac{da_{2d}}{dP_1}$$

This proves Propositions 2 and 3.

## Appendix B. Adjustment factor for investment costs

As explained in Section 3.3, we need to account for the fact that the lifetime of the investments extends beyond the time horizon of our simulations (2050). To adjust for this, we have included a factor that scale down the investment costs based on the remaining lifetime of the investments after 2050. Here we explain how this factor is derived.

Assume that the annual value of an investment is the same before and after 2050 – when adjusting for depreciation and discounting. That is, the annual value after 2050 is equal to the average annual value until 2050 (again, adjusted for depreciation and discounting). This is a simplification, but it is not obvious in which direction (although the number of EVs increase, so does the number of stations). As explained in the main text, stations are assumed to have a lifetime of 40 years, with linear depreciation, i.e., 25% per decade (cf. the table in Appendix C).

Let  $V_{20}$ ,  $V_{30}$  and  $V_{50}$  denote total values of charging stations in respectively 2020–2030, 2030–2050 and beyond 2050, and  $r$  is the discount rate.

The total value of stations invested in 2030 is then (since the lifetime is 40 years, and the capital is depreciated by 50% after two decades):

$$V = V_{30} + \frac{0.5}{(1+r)^{20}} V_{50} = V_{30} \left( 1 + \frac{0.5}{(1+r)^{20}} \right)$$

This gives the following relationship between the value in 2030-50 and total value:

$$\frac{V_{30}}{V} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{0.5}{(1+r)^{20}}}$$

Thus, we adjust the investment costs in 2030 by this factor, i.e., multiply the investment cost function by the factor (which is less than one).

For investments in 2020, things are a bit more complicated as we model two periods. The total value is now (where we account for the fact that  $V_{30}$  covers two decades while  $V_{20}$  and  $V_{50}$  cover one decade each due to the 40 years lifetime):

$$V = V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} + \frac{0.25}{(1+r)^{30}} V_{50}$$

Let  $V_{2030}$  be the following weighted average of  $V_{20}$  and  $V_{30}$ :

$$V_{2030} = \frac{1}{1 + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}}} \left( V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} \right)$$

We then assume that  $V_{50}$  is equal to  $V_{2030}$  (cf. initial assumption). We then have:

$$V = V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} + \frac{0.25}{(1+r)^{30}} V_{50} = V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} + \frac{0.25}{(1+r)^{30}} \frac{1}{1 + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}}} \left( V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} \right)$$

$$= \left( V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{0.25}{(1+r)^{30}} \frac{1}{1 + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}}} \right)$$

This gives the following relationship between the value in 2020-2050 and total value:

$$\frac{\left(V_{20} + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}} V_{30}\right)}{V} = \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{0.25}{(1+r)^{30}} \frac{1}{1 + 2 \frac{0.75}{(1+r)^{10}}}\right)}$$

The left hand side shows the value share in the two first periods of an investment in 2020 (the numerator corresponds to the two first terms in the expression of  $V$ ). In the same way as explained above, we can then adjust the investment costs in 2020 by this factor, i. e., multiply the investment cost function by the factor (which is also less than one, but larger than the previous factor).

## Appendix C. Parameter values

See Table C1.

**Table C1**

Parameters in the numerical model.

Parameter	Description	Value
$\bar{E}_1$	Number of cars in 2030	2,900,000
$\bar{E}_2$	Number of cars in 2050	2,900,000
$G_0$	Number of commercial fast chargers in 2020.	2,200
$K_0$	Number of fast chargers with governmental support in 2020	1,100
$\delta_1$	Depreciation rate of infrastructure, 2020 to 2030	0.25
$\delta_2$	Depreciation rate of infrastructure, 2030 to 2050	0.5
$q_e$	Annual user cost for an EV <i>before</i> subsidies	€ 10,300
$q_f$	Annual user cost for an EV <i>including</i> taxes	€ 10,900
$s_0$	Subsidies to EVs in 2020	€ 1.700
$\mu_0$	Share of EVs in 2020	0.12
$\sigma$	Emissions coefficient; tons of CO <sub>2</sub> per year for an ICEV	2.2
$\rho$	Discount rate	0.04
$\theta_1 = \sum_{i=2020}^{2029} (1-\rho)^{-(i-2020)}$	Discount factor for period 1	8.44
$\theta_2 = (1-\rho)^{2030} \sum_{i=2030}^{2049} (1-\rho)^{-(i-2030)}$	Discount factor for period 2	9.18
$B$	Parameter representing indirect network effects	0.0067
$\eta$	Parameter in the investment cost function	24
$\alpha$	Parameter in EV utility function	12,169
$\beta$	Parameter in EV utility function	0.00051
$A_1$	Parameter in urban charging anxiety function	5.67
$A_2$	Parameter in rural charging anxiety function	2.83
$C$	Parameter in range anxiety function	1,870,000
$\Pi_f$	Parameter in ICEV utility function	10,900

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