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Job Search Incentives and Job Match Quality

Sammendrag

We examine the impacts of time-limited unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) on the duration and outcome of job search in Norway. We use a comprehen-sive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the duration of unemployment spells; ii) their outcomes, iii) subsequent employment stability; and iv) the earnings level associated with the first job. We find that time invested in job search pays off in form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job as well as expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Gaure, Simen, Knut Røed and Lars Westlie

År:

2012

Tidsskrift:

Labour Economics

Serie:

Vitenskapelige tidskrift

JEL:

C14, C15, C41, J64, J65, J68

Nøkkelord:

Multivariate hazards, job search, job quality, timing-of-events, NPMLE, MMPH

Prosjekt:

1181 - Virkninger av en aktivitetsorientert velferdspolitikk

Lenke:

[DOI] [PDF]