Job Search Incentives and Job Match Quality
We examine the impacts of time-limited unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) on the duration and outcome of job search in Norway. We use a comprehen-sive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the duration of unemployment spells; ii) their outcomes, iii) subsequent employment stability; and iv) the earnings level associated with the first job. We find that time invested in job search pays off in form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job as well as expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.
Gaure, Simen, Knut Røed and Lars Westlie
C14, C15, C41, J64, J65, J68
Multivariate hazards, job search, job quality, timing-of-events, NPMLE, MMPH