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Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply

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[DOI] [PDF]

Forfattere:

Eide, Erling, Kristine von Simson og Steinar Strøm

År:

2011

Referanse:

FinanzArchiv

vol 67(3), 261-281

Summary

In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs better than an expected-utility model and that social norms matter in explaining behavior.

Nøkkelord:

LABOR SUPPLY; TAX EVASION; RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY

JEL:

C 25, D 12, D 81, H 26, J 22

Prosjekt info:

Oppdragsgiver: Norges forskningsråd
Oppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
Frisch prosjekt: 1148 - Skatt og arbeidstilbud fra husholdninger