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Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment

Sammendrag

We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual’s utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and suffer a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are not observable.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Asheim, G.B., A.W. Emblem og T. Nilssen

År:

2010

Tidsskrift:

Research in Economics (Ricerche Economiche)

Serie:

Vitenskapelige tidsskrift

Nøkkelord:

Health insurance; Health demand; Disability insurance

Prosjekt:

4101 - Økonomi og helse

Lenke:

[DOI] [PDF]