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Climate Agreements and Technology Policy

Sammendrag

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax. Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Golombek, Rolf and Michael Hoel

År:

2004

Serie:

Andre skrifter

JEL:

O30; H23; Q20; Q28; Q48

Nøkkelord:

Climate policy, international environmental agreements, R&D Policy, technology spillovers

Prosjekt:

3112 - Klimaavtaler og teknologisk utvikling

Finansiering:

Norges forskningsråd

Lenke:

[PDF]