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Individual and household value of mortality reductions with intrahousehold bargaining

Sammendrag

I derive alternative measures of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and value of statistical life (VSL) related to changes in the supply of a public good affecting mortality for both members of two-person households, when members are selfish, live for at most two periods, and strike efficient Nash bargains over consumption of individual and household goods. I find no systematic bias in letting one household member conduct the (WTP or VSL) valuation on behalf of the household. Publicgood VSL may exceed private-good VSL due to each member attaching (purely selfish) preferences to the event that the other member survives or dies, and to a possible net income potential of the other member when surviving in period 2. When period 2 is a retirement period and household members’ incomes are then fixed, interview surveys tend to overvalue VSL due to ignored negative effects of own survival on government pension budgets.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Strand, J.

År:

2004

Serie:

HERO Skrifter
Nummer i serie: 2

Nøkkelord:

Value of statistical life; household bargaining; intertemporal allocation models; optimal life insurance

Prosjekt:

4101 - Økonomi og helse

ISBN:

82-7756-134-2

Kontakt:

jon.strand@econ.uio.no

Finansiering:

Norges forskningsråd

Lenke:

[PDF]