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Unemployment Duration, Incentives and Institutions

Sammendrag

Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, we use the ‘between-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to identify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the benefit re-placement ratio is around -1.0 in Norway and -0.5 in Sweden. The limited benefit dura-tion period in Sweden has a large positive impact on the hazard rate, despite generous renewal options through participation in labour market programs. Compulsory program participation seems to operate as a ‘stick’, rather than a ‘carrot’, and is therefore an effi-cient tool for counteracting moral hazard problems in the benefit system.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Røed, Knut, Jensen, Peter, Thoursie, Anna

År:

2002

Serie:

Memorandum
Nummer i serie: 9

JEL:

C41, J64

Nøkkelord:

Unemployment spells, unemployment compensation, non-parametric duration analysis

Prosjekt:

1212 - Dagpenger og arbeidsmarkedstilpasning i Norden

Kontakt:

knut.roed@frisch.uio.no

Finansiering:

Nordisk Ministerråd og NOS-S

Lenke:

[PDF]