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Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions

Sammendrag

If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court,voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry may bewelfare-improving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreementsdiffer from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimummay be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is notattainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, beassociated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Nyborg, K.

År:

2000

Tidsskrift:

Environmental and Resource Economics

Serie:

Vitenskapelige tidskrift

Prosjekt:

Kontakt:

karine.nyborg@frisch.uio.no