print logo
­

The market for paid sick leave

Sammendrag

In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients’ insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Markussen, Simen and Knut Røed

År:

2017

Tidsskrift:

Journal of Health Economics

Serie:

Vitenskapelige tidsskrift

JEL:

H55,I11,I18

Nøkkelord:

Absenteeism, Gatekeeping, Competition, Role-conflicts

Prosjekt:

4134 - Disentangling absence patterns

Lenke:

[DOI]