print logo
­

Getting Disabled Workers Back to Work: How Important Are Economic Incentives?

Sammendrag

We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is – 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.

Om publikasjonen

Forfattere:

Fevang, Elisabeth, Inés Hardoy, og Knut Røed

År:

2013

Serie:

Andre skrifter

JEL:

H55, I38, J22

Nøkkelord:

temporary disability, rehabilitation, hazard rate models, labor supply

Prosjekt:

1181 - Virkninger av en aktivitetsorientert velferdspolitikk

Lenke:

[PDF]